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Abstract
Land interests on Canadian First Nations reserves have long been governed by the rigid and paternalistic
provisions of the federal Indian Act, which require the permission of the federal Minister of Indigenous Affairs
for even relatively minor land transactions. Yet an increasing number of First Nations have taken advantage of
the 1999 First Nations Land Management Act (FNLMA), which allows First Nations to adopt a custom land
code that replaces most of the reserve land provisions of the Indian Act in their community. This paper seeks
to examine how First Nation communities have chosen to exercise their powers under this Act to define and
regulate land interests on reserve. Working from a database of 33 FNLMA land codes, the authors focus on
three discrete issues on which the codes differ: 1) whether to require a vote of the community as a whole for
the grant of a lease in community-held lands to a non-member; 2) whether to require the approval of the band
council for the transfer of a leasehold interest to a non-member; and 3) whether to require the approval of the
band council for the inter vivos transfer of a member-held interest to another member. Each of these issues
relates to the contentious question of how freely alienable land interests in Indigenous communities should
be—a matter that occupies a kind of ideological fault line involving considerations of economic efficiency and
individual autonomy, on the one hand, and community cohesion and traditional culture, on the other. The
authors make a number of observations relating to the links between the characteristics of communities and
their choice of land regime. Communities with substantial non-First-Nations populations living on reserve
were more likely to adopt rules allowing free alienation of leasehold interests, as well as free alienation of
member interests among members. In addition, First Nations that adopted liberal rules for the transfer of
interests among members experienced larger increases in the proportion of their members living off-reserve in
the years following the adoption of their code. This may indicate that liberal transfer rules among members
help to facilitate exit from the community.
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Minister of Indigenous Affairs for even relatively minor land transactions. Yet an increasing 
number of First Nations have taken advantage of the 1999 First Nations Land Management 
Act (FNLMA), which allows First Nations to adopt a custom land code that replaces most of 
the reserve land provisions of the Indian Act in their community. This paper seeks to examine 
how First Nation communities have chosen to exercise their powers under this Act to define 
and regulate land interests on reserve. Working from a database of 33 FNLMA land codes, 
the authors focus on three discrete issues on which the codes differ: 1) whether to require 
a vote of the community as a whole for the grant of a lease in community-held lands to a 
non-member; 2) whether to require the approval of the band council for the transfer of a 
leasehold interest to a non-member; and 3) whether to require the approval of the band 
council for the inter vivos transfer of a member-held interest to another member. Each of 
these issues relates to the contentious question of how freely alienable land interests in 
Indigenous communities should be—a matter that occupies a kind of ideological fault line 
involving considerations of economic efficiency and individual autonomy, on the one hand, 
and community cohesion and traditional culture, on the other. The authors make a number 
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of observations relating to the links between the characteristics of communities and their 
choice of land regime. Communities with substantial non-First-Nations populations living 
on reserve were more likely to adopt rules allowing free alienation of leasehold interests, 
as well as free alienation of member interests among members. In addition, First Nations 
that adopted liberal rules for the transfer of interests among members experienced larger 
increases in the proportion of their members living off-reserve in the years following the 
adoption of their code. This may indicate that liberal transfer rules among members help to 
facilitate exit from the community.
Les intérêts fonciers sur les réserves des Premières Nations du Canada sont depuis 
longtemps régis par les dispositions rigides et paternalistes de la Loi sur les Indiens, en 
vertu desquelles même des transactions foncières relativement mineures ne peuvent 
se faire sans l’approbation du ministre fédéral des Affaires autochtones. Pourtant, les 
Premières Nations sont de plus en plus nombreuses à tirer profit de la Loi de 1999 sur la 
gestion des terres des premières nations (LGTPN), qui leur permet d’adopter un code foncier 
personnalisé en remplacement de la plupart des dispositions de la Loi sur les Indiens 
relatives aux terres de réserve dans leur communauté. Le présent article vise à examiner 
comment les communautés des Premières Nations ont choisi d’exercer les pouvoirs qui leur 
sont conférés par cette loi afin de définir et de réglementer les intérêts fonciers dans les 
réserves. À partir d’une base de données regroupant 33 codes fonciers établis en vertu de la 
LGTPN, les auteurs se penchent sur trois points de divergence des codes : 1) l’obligation ou 
non d’un vote de l’ensemble de la communauté dans le cadre de l’octroi à un non-membre 
d’un bail sur des terres détenues par la communauté; 2) l’obligation ou non de l’approbation 
du conseil de bande dans le cadre du transfert à un non-membre d’un intérêt à bail; et 3) 
l’obligation ou non de l’approbation du conseil de bande dans le cadre du transfert entre vifs 
d’un intérêt détenu par un membre à un autre membre. Chacun de ces points se rapporte 
à la question controversée de savoir dans quelle mesure les intérêts fonciers doivent être 
librement aliénables dans les communautés autochtones; cette question fait ressortir une 
sorte de ligne de fracture idéologique entre, d’un côté, l’efficacité économique et l’autonomie 
individuelle et, de l’autre, la cohésion communautaire et la culture traditionnelle. Les 
auteurs formulent diverses observations concernant les liens entre les caractéristiques des 
communautés et leur choix de régime foncier. Les communautés des Premières Nations 
qui comptent de nombreuses populations non autochtones vivant dans les réserves étaient 
plus susceptibles d’adopter des règles autorisant la libre aliénation des intérêts à bail et 
la libre aliénation des intérêts des particuliers entre les membres. Par ailleurs, dans les 
communautés des Premières Nations qui ont adopté des règles souples en matière de 
transfert d’intérêts entre les membres, la proportion des membres vivant hors réserve 
a davantage augmenté au cours des années qui ont suivi l’adoption d’un code foncier. Ce 
constat peut indiquer que l’existence de règles souples en matière de transfert facilite les 
départs de la communauté.
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FOR MUCH OF THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES, Canadian policy in relation to 
Aboriginal lands was conducted in a rigid, paternalistic, and centralized manner. 
This approach is exemplified by the land provisions of the federal Indian Act, 
which create a one-size-fits-all model for land interests on First Nations reserves 
and require the approval of the federal Minister of Indigenous Affairs for all 
but the most minor transactions.1 Needless to say, this model was imposed on 
Indigenous communities without their consent and with little regard for the 
specific norms, institutions, values, and circumstances of each community. This 
approach was all but certain to result in rules that were maladapted to local 
needs. Indeed, the top-down nature of Aboriginal policy in this era has long been 
identified as the source of a great many harms.2
Land interests on most Canadian First Nations reserves remain governed 
by the provisions of the Indian Act. Yet an increasing number of First Nations 
have taken advantage of the 1999 First Nations Land Management Act (FNLMA), 
which allows bands to adopt a custom land code that replaces most of the reserve 
land provisions of the Indian Act in their community.3 The FNLMA was the 
result of a First Nations-led movement for greater flexibility and autonomy with 
respect to land interests on reserve. It is widely regarded as a success story, both in 
taking back governance authority from the federal government and in facilitating 
1. Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5 [Indian Act]. Some degree of customization within the Indian 
Act is possible through the use of “53/60” delegation. See Section I, below.
2. See e.g. Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Canada 
Communications Group, 1996), vol 1 at 282-85 & vol 2 at 485-519.
3. First Nations Land Management Act, SC 1999, c 24 [FNLMA].
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economic development.4 At this time, roughly fifty-eight First Nations have had 
land codes come into force, and more than one hundred are at various stages of 
adopting a land code.5
As the FNLMA approaches its 20th anniversary, it seems appropriate to ask 
how groups have chosen to exercise their powers under the FNLMA to define 
and regulate land interests on reserve, and how these choices reflect the values 
and circumstances of each community. Working from a database of thirty-three 
land codes made available through the First Nations Land Management Resource 
4. Two reports prepared by KPMG for the First Nations Lands Advisory Board underscored 
the benefits of operating under an FNLMA land code, including markedly reduced 
transaction costs associated with land transactions. See KPMG, “Cost/Benefit Analysis of 
Future Investment in the Framework Agreement on First Nations Land Management” (27 
January 2010), online: First Nations Land Management Resource Centre <https://labrc.
com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/FNLM-Benefits-Report_FINAL_Jan-27_2010.pdf> 
[KPMG Report I] and KMPG, “Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Management: 
Update Assessment of Socio/Economic Development Benefits” (27 February 2014), 
online: First Nations Land Management Resource Centre <https://labrc.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/03/FNLM-Benefits-Review-Final-Report_Feb-27-2014.pdf> [KPMG 
Report II]. These studies also indicated a high degree of satisfaction among First Nations 
communities with their land codes, including the flexibility it gave them in structuring land 
transactions, as well as the ability to protect community values. A study of two land codes 
under the FNLMA similarly emphasized the reduced transaction costs achieved through 
land codes. See Christopher Alcantara, “Reduce Transaction Costs? Yes. Strengthen Property 
Rights? Maybe: The First Nations Land Management Act and Economic Development 
on Canadian Indian Reserves” (2007) 132: 3/4 Public Choice [Alcantara]. Praise for the 
FNLMA has not been unanimous. See Janice Switlo, “Apple Cede: First Nations Land 
Management Regime” (1999), online: < http://www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/apple-cede.
pdf>. The racially charged and possibly offensive title of this paper gives a sense of its tone. 
(An apple is red on the outside and white on the inside.) The author views the FNLMA as a 
tool of assimilation. In making this argument, the author engages in a creative and arguably 
misleading interpretation of the FNLMA, stating, for instance, that adopting a land code 
amounts to surrender to the Crown, and that provinces would become beneficial owners of 
reserve land under the FNLMA. These claims are contradicted by s 5 of the FNLMA. It may 
also be possible to argue that the FNLMA does not give First Nations sufficient flexibility 
over land tenure to fully reflect Indigenous legal traditions. Others have criticized the 
FNLMA for being expensive to implement and for opening bands to increased liability, such 
that some bands are unable to adopt a land code for financial reasons. See Canada, House 
of Commons, Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 
Standing of Land Management and Sustainable Economic Development on First Nations Reserve 
Lands (Library of Parliament: Ottawa, 2014) (Chair: Chris Warkentin) at 29-30 [House of 
Commons Report].
5. Lands Advisory Board, Annual Report (2015-2016), online: First Nation Land Management 
Resource Centre <https://labrc.com/reports/> [Lands Advisory Board Annual Report].
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Centre, this article begins to answer these questions.6 In particular, we identify 
three matters on which First Nations under the FNLMA have made different 
choices about the rules governing land interests on reserve: (1) whether to require 
a vote of the community as a whole for the grant of a lease in community-held 
lands to a non-member; (2) whether to require the approval of the band council 
or a delegated body for the transfer of any leasehold interest to a non-member; 
and (3) whether to require the approval of the band council or a delegated body 
for the inter vivos transfer of one member’s interest to another member. Each of 
these issues relates to the loaded question of how freely alienable land interests 
should be in Indigenous communities. Table 1 (in the Appendix) summarizes the 
approach that each of the thirty-three communities has taken on these questions.
The alienability of land is a contentious issue both within Indigenous 
communities and more generally, because it occupies an ideological fault line 
involving considerations of economic efficiency and individual autonomy on the 
one hand, and community cohesion and traditional culture on the other.7 Under 
the right circumstances, liberal land markets enhance economic efficiency by 
allowing land interests to flow to their most valuable uses, while at the same time 
giving individual interest-holders greater power to use their interests in accordance 
6. Lands Advisory Board, “First Nation Land Management Resource Centre,” online: First 
Nation Land Management Resource Centre <https://labrc.com/resources/> [FNLM 
Resource Centre]. The land codes database was accessed in May 2016. Copies of the land 
codes used in the study are on file with the authors. In general, land codes are not made 
publicly available on a First Nation’s website, though under the FNLMA they must be 
available for inspection in person at a place designated by the First Nation’s band council.  
See FNLMA, supra note 3, s 15(2).
7. See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) at 33-42, 178-91; Robert Ellickson, “Property in Land” (1993) 
102:6 Yale LJ 1315 at 1375-80 [Ellickson]; Richard A Epstein, “Why Restrain Alienation?” 
(1985) 85:5 Colum L Rev 970 [Epstein]; Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Inalienability and the 
Theory of Property Rights” (1985) 85:5 Colum L Rev 931; Kenneth H Bobroff, “Indian 
Law in Property: Johnson v. M’Intosh and Beyond” (2001) 37:2 Tulsa L Rev 521 at 537-38; 
Tom Flanagan, Christopher Alcantara & André Le Dressay, Beyond the Indian Act: Restoring 
Aboriginal Property Rights (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2010) at 123-36; 
Malcolm Lavoie, “Why Restrain Alienation of Indigenous Lands?” (2016) 49:3 UBC L Rev 
997 at 1029-49 [Lavoie].
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with their own goals and desires.8 However, freely alienable land interests can 
undermine the close-knittedness of a community and its capacity to maintain 
cultural norms that differ from those of the wider settler society.9 If members can 
more readily transfer their interests and leave the community, and if non-members 
can readily acquire interests and enter the community, the community’s ability to 
function as a locus of a distinctive culture may be undermined.
When it comes to alienability of land interests, the approaches adopted by 
First Nations under the FNLMA differ widely. While First Nations under the 
FNLMA are not able to provide for the transfer of fee simple interests in their 
land to either members or non-members,10 they do have a relatively free hand in 
designing provisions relating to leasehold interests, which can be held by both 
members and non-members, as well as provisions relating to the possessory 
interests of band members, most commonly known as certificates of possession 
or allotments. Some communities, including the Tla-amin Nation (formerly 
the Sliammon First Nation), adopted transfer rules that are demonstrably less 
restrictive than the Indian Act with respect to all three questions under study.11 
Under the amended Sliammon First Nation Land Code (recently superseded by 
the Tla’amin Final Agreement), community lands could be leased by the council 
to a member or non-member for any length of time and without a vote of the 
community as a whole.12 Leasehold interests of any duration could be transferred 
to a non-member without the approval of the band council or another body.13 
Finally, permanent member interests in community lands could be transferred to 
8. Lavoie, supra note 7. Two recent papers rely on literature in development economics to 
underscore the institutional preconditions for the successful use of formalized and alienable 
land interests as development tools, as well as some of the trade-offs associated with doing so. 
Jamie Baxter & Michael Trebilcock, “‘Formalizing’ Land Tenure in First Nations: Evaluating 
the Case for Reserve Tenure Reform” (2009) 7:2 Indigenous LJ 45 at 63-66 [Baxter & 
Trebilcock]; Sari Graben, “Lessons for Indigenous Property Reform: From Membership to 
Ownership on Nisga’a Lands” (2014) 47 UBC L Rev 399 at 424-30 [Graben].
9. Ellickson, supra note 7 at 1378; Baxter & Trebilcock, supra note 8 at 65; Graben, supra note 
8 at 421; Lavoie, supra note 7.
10. FNLMA, supra note 3, ss 5, 26(1).
11. Sliammon First Nation: Amended Land Code (2011), ss 12.1, 31.4, 31.5, 31.6, 33.1 & 34.3, 
online: <https://labrc.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Sliammon-Land-Code-Amended.
pdf>. On 5 April 2016, the Tla’amin Final Agreement came into effect, removing the 
Tla’amin Nation from the jurisdiction of the FNLMA and transferring existing reserve land 
to the Tla’amin Nation in fee simple. See Tla’amin Final Agreement (2014), online: <https://
www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1397152724601/1397152939293>. Under the terms of the 
agreement, the Sliammon First Nation: Amended Land Code is no longer in force.
12. Sliammon First Nation: Amended Land Code, supra note 11, ss 31.4, 31.5, 33.1.
13. Ibid, s 31.6.
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another member of the Tla’amin Nation without council approval.14 By contrast, 
other First Nations, including the Chemawawin Cree Nation, have adopted rules 
that restrict transactions to almost the same degree as the Indian Act.15 Transfers of 
both leasehold and member interests require the approval of the band council.16 
Leases in community lands of greater than 25 years are put to a vote of the 
community as a whole.17 It is as if some First Nations have elected to use the 
powers under the FNLMA to adopt rules aimed at capturing the economic and 
other benefits of liberalized land markets, while others have gone in the opposite 
direction, using their powers primarily to reinforce community cohesion and 
collective control over their land base.18
In approaching the topic of land code choice by First Nations, we start from 
the thesis that, generally speaking, the First Nations in question can be expected 
to adopt rules that are adapted to the interests of their members, or that are at 
least more closely adapted to their interests than are the Indian Act provisions. 
These are small communities19 with culturally homogeneous memberships and 
long experience living under the Indian Act. A proposed land code must earn 
broad community support before it can come into force.20 In adopting a land 
code, First Nations are likely to have a sense of which of the Indian Act land 
provisions worked poorly in relation to the interests of members and to seek 
to change these provisions in a manner that better accords with those interests. 
Crucially, we understand interests broadly to include not only material economic 
interests, but also members’ interests in governing their land in accordance with 
community values, maintaining community cohesion, and preserving their 
distinctive culture.21
In what follows, we use a database of thirty-three land codes, along with 
public data from past Canadian censuses and from Indigenous and Northern 
14. Ibid, s 34.3.
15. Chemawawin Cree Nation Land Code (2010), ss 12.1, 34.1, online: < http://www.labrc.
com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Chemawawin-Land-Code.pdf>. See FNLM Resource 
Centre, supra note 6.
16. Chemawawin Cree Nation Land Code, supra note 15, s 34.1.
17. Ibid, s 12.1.
18. This is an observation made by Chief Darcy Bear, Whitecap Dakota First Nation, 
in a conversation with the authors (17 August 2016) [Chief Darcy Bear].
19. Of the 33 First Nations in the sample, the smallest has 87 registered members and the largest 
has 5943. The average size is 1037 and the median size is 840. See Indigenous and Northern 
Affairs Canada, First Nations Profiles (2016), online: Government of Canada Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada <http://aandc-aadnc.gc.ca/fnp/Main/index.aspx?lang=eng>.
20. FNLMA, supra note 3, s 12.
21. In doing so, we mirror the approach adopted in Ellickson, supra note 7 at 1320-21.
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Affairs Canada, to test whether certain community characteristics can help 
explain the rules selected by the First Nations. Among the key results of this study 
are that First Nations in British Columbia (BC) were significantly more likely 
to adopt non-restrictive or “liberal” rules relating to the granting and transfer of 
leasehold interests than bands elsewhere in the country. In addition, communities 
with substantial non-First-Nations populations living on reserve at the time the 
FNLMA was adopted were more likely to adopt rules allowing free alienation 
of leasehold interests, as well as free alienation of member land interests among 
members. However, First Nations that allowed the free transfer of leasehold 
interests were more likely to require a vote of the entire community prior to the 
initial grant of a lease, even for relatively short leases. It seems that communities 
that elected to give up ongoing control over lease transfer were more inclined to 
implement the safeguard of a community vote at the outset of the lease. Finally, 
we observe that First Nations that adopted liberal rules for the transfer of land 
interests among members experienced larger increases in the proportion of their 
members living off-reserve in the years following the adoption of their code. This 
trend may indicate that liberal transfer rules among members help to facilitate 
exit from the community. Such rules might also lead to a higher concentration 
of ownership with respect to member land interests. This possibility underscores 
the serious nature of the trade-offs communities face in making choices relating 
to the alienability of land interests.
This article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we outline the Indian Act lands 
regime that applied to all the communities under study prior to the enactment 
of custom land codes under the FNLMA. We also briefly outline the history 
and structure of the FNLMA regime and make some general observations 
about the similarities and differences in the codes adopted under the FNLMA. 
In Part  II, we establish a theoretical framework for land regime choice in 
close-knit communities, and in particular the trade-offs involved in restraining 
the alienation of land interests in such communities. From these observations we 
derive a number of predictions regarding the characteristics of communities that 
would be more or less open to alienable interests. Part III presents the results of 
our survey of land codes and seeks to interpret the results in light of the theoretical 
framework outlined in section II. Part IV concludes.
This article seeks, first and foremost, to understand some of the ways in 
which Canadian First Nations have used powers recognized under the FNLMA 
to advance local priorities. However, we hope that the article also illustrates some 
of the more general trade-offs faced by close-knit cultural minority communities 
that seek to use interests in land to maintain a distinctive culture and way of life. 
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These communities include Indigenous communities, but also other groups, 
including certain religious minorities who live in distinct, largely closed societies. 
Land markets present both the potential for economic development and a 
possible threat to community values. Reasonably good demographic and other 
data exist for the communities that are empowered by the FNLMA to make 
choices on these matters. Accordingly, we hope that this article provides some 
general insights into the nature of the choices such communities face in relation 
to the alienability of land interests.
I. THE FIRST NATIONS LAND MANAGEMENT ACT REGIME
Roughly thirty-five sections in the Indian Act deal with the management of 
land and resources on reserve. Generally speaking, approval by the Minister 
of Indigenous Affairs is required to carry out any land- or resource-related 
transaction governed by these provisions, including the grant or transfer of 
leasehold interests or certificates of possession.22 Certificates of possession are 
permanent interests held by individual band members under the Indian Act that 
give rise to an exclusive right to use and possess land within a reserve. They can 
only be held by Status Indians.23 Lands held under a certificate of possession may 
be leased to third parties, using the Minister as an intermediary.24
Before community land on reserve can be leased, it must be designated for 
leasing purposes.25 A designation is a time-limited surrender of reserve lands to 
the Crown. It must be approved by a majority of participating eligible voters 
of the First Nation, referred for decision to the Minister through a supportive 
band council resolution, and then approved by the Minister.26 Ministerial 
approval alone is required for the transfer of a certificate of possession to another 
band member or the transfer of a leasehold interest.27 Leases and certificates of 
possession (but not customary interests) must be registered through the Indian 
Land Registry System.28 A major complaint of First Nations with respect to 
22. Indian Act, supra note 1, ss 20, 24, 38(2), 54.
23. Ibid, ss 20(2), 24.
24. Ibid, s 58(3).
25. It is possible for the Minister, acting alone, to grant a right to use or occupy reserve land 
for a period of one year or less though a “permit” (see Indian Act, ibid, s 28(2)). However, 
under the Indian Act, a “lease” of any duration requires that the land be designated through a 
process that involves a vote of the community members (see Indian Act, ibid, s 37(2)).
26. Ibid, s 39.1.
27. Ibid, ss 24, 54.
28. Ibid, ss 21, 55.
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land management under the Indian Act has been the long waiting periods for 
departmental approval of transactions and for registration of land interests.29
Sections 53 and 60 of the Indian Act allow for the Governor in Council 
to delegate aspects of the management of leases and permits to a First Nation, 
and a small number of First Nations have succeeded in obtaining this delegated 
authority.30 Yet while “53/60” delegation allows First Nations increased control 
over their own lands, it falls short of the control and certainty offered by the 
FNLMA regime. The Indigenous Affairs department retains the authority to 
register leases and permits, and land must still be designated to the Crown for a 
lease to be granted. Furthermore, First Nations with sections 53/60 authority may 
not alter legal institutions in significant ways, for instance by changing the rules 
governing land tenure. Finally, the Governor in Council retains the discretion to 
withdraw the “53/60” delegation unilaterally at any time.31
It was against this legislative backdrop that the FNLMA emerged. The 
Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Management was initially negotiated 
between Canada and fourteen First Nations.32 It was finalized in 1996 and ratified 
in 1999 through the passage of the FNLMA. The Framework Agreement provided 
for a Lands Advisory Board to deliver support and services to member First 
Nations in developing and implementing land codes and to advise the Minister 
on implementation of the regime.33 The Lands Advisory Board subsequently 
created the First Nation Land Management Resource Centre to provide technical 
training for land managers and other First Nation staff with responsibilities 
under the regime.
The FNLMA regime was initially restricted to the original fourteen First 
Nation signatories to the Framework Agreement. However, the FNLMA provided 
the Governor in Council with the power to add any other First Nation to the 
regime.34 Today, fifty-eight First Nations have had land codes come into force.35 
29. House of Commons Report, supra note 4 at 17-19. For survey data on the lengthy delays 
associated with transactions under the Indian Act, see KPMG Report II, supra note 4 at 9.
30. Indian Act, supra note 1, ss 53, 60.
31. Ibid, s 60(2).
32. Lands Advisory Board, Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Management, 12 February 
1996, online: First Nation Land Management Resource Centre <https://labrc.com/
framework-agreement/> [Framework Agreement]. It bears mentioning that this agreement 
emerged amidst the work of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, whose focus 
included the barriers to economic prosperity and self-determination presented by the Indian 
Act reserve system.
33. Ibid, ss 38-41.
34. FNLMA, supra note 3, ss 6-17.
35. Lands Advisory Board Annual Report, supra note 5.
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In order to be deemed eligible by the department for entry into the FNLMA regime, 
a First Nation must meet basic requirements related to financial management 
history and capacity and provide information related to its readiness to adopt 
and administer its own code.36 After a successful application has been approved 
by the Minister, the First Nation must negotiate an individual agreement with 
the federal government and develop its land code.37
Together, the FNLMA and the Framework Agreement set out the mandatory 
content requirements for a land code.38 For instance, land codes must include 
general rules and procedures applicable to use and occupancy of the lands, such 
as use and occupancy under licences, leases, certificates of possession, and other 
member interests, and the granting or expropriation of interests or rights in these 
lands. They must speak to the procedures that apply to the management of interests 
at issue in the event of a breakdown of a marriage or in the implementation of 
a will. Land codes must also identify a forum for dealing with disputes related 
to these interests or rights, define the rules for enacting land laws, and set out 
procedures for amending the code. Lands remain reserve lands once the land 
code is enacted and cannot be alienated except through expropriation by or land 
exchanges with the federal government.39 Title to reserve land technically remains 
vested with the Crown, and this is not affected by a land code.40
Both the land code and the associated agreement with the federal government 
must be ratified by a majority of all eligible voters within the First Nation after 
independent verification that the code complies with the Framework Agreement 
and the FNLMA.41 Both documents must then be approved by the Minister. 
Upon the Minister’s approval, the control and administration of the First Nation’s 
land and resources are transferred to the First Nation.42 At this point the First 
Nation is permanently exempted from the land management provisions of the 
36. First Nations Land Management Readiness Guide (2013), online: Indigenous and Northern 
Affairs Canada < https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1367432545445/1367432634043>.
37. The individual agreement between a First Nation and the Minister must describe the lands 
that will be subject to the land management regime. It must also provide for the terms of the 
transfer of administration of the lands, describe interests that have previously been granted 
by the Crown in the lands, and set out an interim environmental assessment process. See 
FNLMA, supra note 3, s 6(3).
38. FNLMA, supra note 3, s 6(1); Framework Agreement, supra note 32, s 5.2.
39. FNLMA, ibid, s 26; Framework Agreement, ibid, s 13.3.
40. FNLMA, ibid, s 5; Framework Agreement, ibid, s 13.1.
41. FNLMA, ibid, ss 8-14; Framework Agreement, ibid, ss 7-11, 44.
42. FNLMA, ibid, s 16; Framework Agreement, ibid, s 12.
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Indian Act and takes on the rights, powers, and privileges of a land owner, along 
with substantial regulatory powers in relation to First Nation lands.43
First Nations are provided with significant discretion regarding approval 
requirements and other matters that must be dealt with under their land codes. 
For example, the only matters for which community approval is mandatory are 
the finalization of the agreement with the federal government, the passage of 
the land code, and the voluntary exchange of First Nation land with the federal 
Crown.44 The Framework Agreement and the FNLMA do not prescribe what, 
if any, approval requirements or other limits should be placed on the lease of 
lands and the transfer of leases and member interests.
For some matters, First Nations have generally chosen to adopt similar 
provisions in their codes. All First Nations in this study require that interests 
established after the coming into force of their land code be registered, while 
pre-existing interests continue in force without registration. All but three First 
Nations allow for some form of band expropriation of lands,45 and all but two 
have established a local body to advise on or make decisions concerning land 
management under the code.46 None of the First Nation land codes explicitly 
prohibits the mortgaging of leasehold interests. And none allow for transfer of a 
permanent member interest in reserve land to a non-member.47
The First Nation Land Management Resource Centre has attempted 
to provide some guidance on land code content through a model land code, 
drafted in 2007. This model code suggests, among other things, a requirement 
for community approval of leases (or lease renewals) on community lands with a 
term exceeding 25 years, a requirement for band council approval of the transfer 
43. FNLMA, ibid, ss 18-24; Framework Agreement, ibid.
44. FNLMA, ibid, ss 12, 27(4); Framework Agreement, ibid, ss 7, 14(2).
45. Chippewas of Georgina Island First Nation, Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation, 
and T’Souke First Nation prohibit band expropriation under their codes. See Chippewas 
of Georgina Island First Nation Land Code (9 April 1997), at s 28.1; Mississaugas of Scugog 
Island First Nation Land Management Code (29 August 1997), at s 29.1; T’souke First Nation 
Land Code (11 January 2006), at s 15.1. Codes available online. See FNLM Resource 
Centre, supra note 6.
46. We Wei Kai First Nation and Westbank First Nation do not identify a lands committee 
in their codes, although Westbank’s code allowed for the possibility that such a committee 
could be established at some point. See We Wei Kai First Nation Land Code (1 August 2008); 
Westbank First Nation Land Code (30 April 2003). Codes available online. See FNLM 
Resource Centre, supra note 6
47. It is not clear that First Nations have the power to allow permanent interests to be transferred 
to non-members, since the FNLMA prohibits the “alienation” of First Nations land. See 
FNLMA, supra note 3, s 26(1).
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of a leasehold interest to a non-member, and no requirement for council or 
community approval of the transfer of a member interest to another member.48
The land codes adopted by First Nations diverge to a significant extent on the 
three matters of special interest this article. Of the thirty-three codes we studied, 
twenty-seven require a vote of the community as a whole to lease community 
lands to a non-member, while six do not.49 However, the lease-term threshold for 
requiring such a vote differs across the communities. Thirteen of the codes have a 
threshold of 35 years or more, and seven have a threshold of 15 years or less. Only 
six codes do not require council or other approval for the transfer of an existing 
leasehold interest to a non-member, while the remaining twenty-seven do require 
such approval. Ten codes require council or other approval for the transfer of a 
member interest to another member, while the remaining twenty-three do not.
These differences point to a divergence in the land code choice strategies 
adopted by First Nations that researchers have already partially identified. 
In an in-depth study of two FNLMA codes (those of the Scugog and Muskoday 
First Nations), Christopher Alcantara observed that one was oriented around 
strengthening property rights and encouraging investment, while the other 
emphasized the preservation of customary property interests and collective 
community control over the land base.50 Our study suggests that the differing 
approaches and priorities with respect to these two land codes are part 
of a wider trend.
Finally, it should be noted that three of the land codes in the sample are 
no longer in force, having been replaced under self-government or land claims 
agreements.51 The dates on which the codes were superseded are noted in 
Table 1. We have retained these codes in our analysis because they may still 
provide insight into the characteristics of the communities that adopted them, 
at the time of adoption.
48. “Model Land Code” (27 September 2007), online: First Nation Land Management Resource 
Centre <https://labrc.com/resources/>.
49. Communities that do not require a vote of the community as a whole for the granting 
of a lease to a non-member instead require approval by the band council and/or a land 
management advisory committee.
50. Alcantara, supra note 4.
51. The land codes of the Tla’amin Nation, the Tsawwassen First Nation, and the Westbank First 
Nation are no longer in force. Details on the agreements that superseded them are provided 
in notes to Table 1 in the Appendix.
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II. LAND REGIME CHOICE IN CLOSE-KNIT COMMUNITIES
A. FIRST NATIONS AS CLOSE-KNIT COMMUNITIES
In the analysis that follows, we start from the thesis that a First Nation adopting a 
land code under the FNLMA will usually select a regime that is better adapted to 
members’ interests, understood broadly, than the Indian Act regime that preceded 
it. This approach is intuitive. Barring undue influence from some narrow 
interest group, it seems reasonable to assume that the land regime chosen by the 
community’s leaders and ratified through a community vote would tend to reflect 
the interests of community members. This is also consistent with observations 
that have been made about land regime choice in close-knit communities 
generally,52 as well as findings to the effect that a key to successful economic 
development in Indigenous communities is the devolution of rule-making and 
institutional design powers to the community level to allow regimes to be tailored 
to local circumstances and values.53
Robert Ellickson famously observed that land rules within a close-knit group 
evolve in a manner that minimizes members’ costs.54 These costs were understood 
broadly to include not only material economic well-being but also values related 
to liberty, privacy, equality, and community.55 By “close-knit,” he meant groups 
in which power is broadly dispersed and members have regular face-to-face 
interactions with one another.56 These requirements ensure that members of the 
group have both the necessary information to perceive when a rule is too costly 
relative to its benefits and the power to do something about it when it is.
The thirty-three First Nations in our sample appear to qualify as close-knit. 
They are small, with an average membership of 1,037 and a median of 840. 
Only three have more than 2,000 members, and only one, the Opaskwayak Cree 
Nation, has a membership greater than 3,000. Accordingly, these are communities 
in which a member can become acquainted with a significant proportion of the 
52. Ellickson, supra note 7 at 1320-21.
53. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P Kalt, “Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for 
Economic Development on American Indian Reservations” in What Can Tribes Do? 
Strategies and Institutions in American Economic Development (Los Angeles: UCLA American 
Indian Studies Centre, 1992) 2 [Cornell & Kalt, “Reloading the Dice”]; Stephen Cornell 
& Joseph P Kalt, “Where’s the glue? Institutional and cultural foundations of American 
Indian economic development” (2000) 29 Journal of Socio-Economics 443 [Cornell & Kalt, 
“Where’s the glue?”].
54. Ellickson, supra note 7 at 1320.
55. Ibid at 1321.
56. Ibid at 1320-21.
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other members. Information about the effects of land transactions can readily 
be shared. Moreover, power over land rules is, at least in formal terms, broadly 
dispersed among community members. Significant changes to rules governing 
land tenure, including the adoption of a land code, must generally be approved 
by a vote of the community as a whole. Ellickson’s framework, then, provides a 
basis for suspecting that land tenure rules in these First Nations communities will 
move in a direction that minimizes members’ costs.
The notion that First Nations with the authority under the FNLMA to choose 
their own land tenure regime will tend to select rules that improve on the Indian 
Act is also consistent with a body of literature relating to economic development 
in Indigenous communities. Indigenous policies have been imposed by Canadian 
governments over the past 150 years in a top-down manner without regard for 
local institutions, values, and circumstances. This rigid and centralized approach 
has long been identified as a source of harm in Indigenous communities.57 It 
follows that devolution of decision-making power should provide a basis for the 
adoption of regimes that are better adapted to local circumstances. The authors 
of the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development reinforce 
this position, arguing that tribal sovereignty is a key to prosperity in Indigenous 
communities, in part because it allows for the development of institutions 
congruent with local culture.58
Empirical evidence reveals a high degree of satisfaction among First Nations 
that have adopted an FNLMA land code, at least when comparing their regime 
to the Indian Act. According to surveys conducted in 2009 and 2013 by KPMG 
on behalf of the First Nations Lands Advisory Board, not a single respondent 
First Nation with an FNLMA land code indicated a desire to return to the Indian 
Act regime.59 Moreover, bands indicated a high degree of satisfaction with their 
flexibility in structuring land transactions under the FNLMA, as well as their 
ability to protect community values.60 While these surveys only addressed the 
perceptions of the leaders rather than ordinary members of these communities 
57. Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol 1, supra note 2 at 282-85 & vol 
2, supra note 2 at 485-519. See also Terry L Anderson, Sovereign Nations or Reservations?: 
An Economic History of American Indians (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public 
Policy, 1995) at 161-76.
58. Cornell & Kalt, “Reloading the Dice”, supra note 53; Cornell & Kalt, “Where’s the glue?”, 
supra note 53. See also John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2016) at 35-40 (in reference to the need for sensitivity to 
distinctive Indigenous approaches to property in land).
59. KPMG Report I, supra note 4 at 36; KPMG Report II, supra note 4 at 8.
60. KPMG Report I, ibid at 35-37; KPMG Report II, ibid at 14.
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and were limited to communities that chose to respond to the surveys, they 
provide at least a tentative basis for concluding that the land codes were an 
improvement over the prior regime.
The thesis we advance here is not that First Nations adopting a land code will 
select the best of all possible regimes, but rather that, having had long experience 
operating under the Indian Act, these First Nations will tend to select rules that 
reflect their experience by moving away from approaches that have proved costly 
to members’ interests. In other words, the land codes will be an improvement 
over the Indian Act regime. For instance, under the Indian Act, the transfer of 
a certificate of possession to another member of the First Nation requires the 
approval of the Minister. As set out in Table 1, a number of First Nations have 
replicated an analogous requirement in their land codes by requiring the consent 
of the band council for such a transfer. Other First Nations have not replicated 
this requirement, subjecting such transfers only to registration and other formal 
requirements, but not the discretionary approval of the band council or another 
body. Our operating assumption is that for bands that eliminated a discretionary 
approval requirement, the costs were seen to outweigh the benefits, while those 
that retained this requirement viewed it as a valuable safeguard against some 
perceived harm that could be associated with liberalized transactions.
If the assumption that First Nations will tend to select rules that reflect 
their members’ interests holds true, then the choices made by communities on 
important questions like alienability should be intelligible in relation to those 
interests. Accordingly, one might be able to observe trends in rule choice based 
on factors that may be related to members’ interests, such as the community’s 
remoteness, its level of economic development, the proportion of non-Aboriginal 
individuals living in the community, and the proportion of band members 
living off-reserve. In addition, a factor such as the geographic location of the 
community could serve as a proxy for the political or cultural commitments 
of members if, for example, First Nations in British Columbia tended to have 
different commitments from First Nations elsewhere.
B. CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO ALIENABILITY
Next, we must examine which types of considerations one would expect to guide 
First Nations’ choices with respect to the alienability of land interests. In general 
terms, more liberal rules regarding the alienation of land interests can encourage 
economic development under the right circumstances, particularly where interests 
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are well-defined and institutions like registries are in place.61 Restrictions on 
alienation introduce transaction costs that impede the ability to move land from 
lower- to higher-value uses.62 Accordingly, mutually beneficial exchanges may be 
deterred. It appears that most, if not all, land codes have the effect of reducing 
transaction costs to at least some extent when compared with the Indian Act 
regime, since they tend to reduce the rather long delays associated with approval 
and registration of transactions under the Indian Act.63 Yet maintaining council 
or community approval requirements adds a cost to transactions that would not 
exist in the absence of such requirements. Restrictions on alienation also often 
impede the ability of interest holders to use the land as security, thus impeding 
access to capital.64 In addition to economic benefits, liberal transfer rules enhance 
the autonomy of the individual holders of land interests. An individual interest 
holder with the power to alienate has a greater ability to use the interest to pursue 
his or her objectives, including by selling the interest, deciding who the next 
holder will be, or pledging the interest for capital.65
Yet alienability can also come with costs, both in strictly economic terms and 
in terms of other values that fall under the broad heading of community interests. 
For instance, a collectively held land base can serve an important risk-spreading 
function in less-developed economies, in that individuals who fall on hard times 
can rely on the resources of the community.66 Alienable individual interests can 
erode this collectively held land base, and thus undermine this risk-spreading 
function. Alienable land interests can also lead to undue concentrations of 
interests in the hands of a small number of members, leading to economic 
61. Chief Darcy Bear of the Whitecap Dakota First Nation strongly emphasized the wide range 
of institutions that need to be in place in order to maximize the benefits of land markets, 
including zoning, residential taxation, dispute resolution, and business and environmental 
regulation. See Chief Darcy Bear, supra note 18.
62. Epstein, supra note 7 at 972.
63. KPMG Report II, supra note 4 at 9.
64. A First Nation may act as the guarantor for mortgages on member-held land that cannot be 
transferred to non-members, and many land codes provide for such arrangements. However, 
such mortgages often involve higher transaction costs than off-reserve mortgages, because 
they usually require the approval of the band council and are limited by the band’s ability 
to provide guarantees to creditors. Leasehold interests that require council approval for 
transfer typically also require council approval for mortgages, adding to the transaction costs 
associated with such mortgages.
65. Epstein, supra note 7 at 971; James W Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) at 30.
66. Ellickson, supra note 7 at 1341; Baxter & Trebilcock, supra note 8 at 64.
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inequality.67 Because of the costs associated with registries and other trappings of 
modern land markets, systems of alienable interests are also generally more costly 
to administer than systems of collectively held land or individual land interests 
that do not often change hands.68 Indeed, one possible motivation for requiring 
approval for on-reserve transactions is that the interests will not be well-defined in 
the first place. By requiring council approval for a transaction, a community can 
help mitigate conflicts relating to the definition of land interests.69 The process of 
formalizing and defining interests with precision may thus be seen as a precursor 
to allowing freer transactions, but this process is not without costs.
Alienable land interests also have potential costs related to the community’s 
culture and collective way of life. Generally speaking, alienable land interests are 
seen to be inimical to the fostering of close-knit communities.70 Liberal alienation 
rules can make it easier for non-members to come into the community, and, just 
as importantly, can make it easier for members to leave.71 This turnover of people 
can impede the development of close connections among members. This is an 
especially pressing concern for a cultural group that forms a small minority within 
a state. A group that does not maintain close connections among members may 
succumb to assimilationist pressures. In addition, by privileging the individual 
autonomy of interest holders, liberal land markets can also be contrary to any 
collectivist orientation in the traditional culture of the group, and may thus serve 
to undermine this aspect of the culture.
Alienable land interests can result in a significant erosion of a community’s 
land base, effectively undermining the group’s ability to govern activities in its 
territory in accordance with its distinctive values.72 While the threat is not quite 
as acute in the case of leasehold interests as it would be with respect to outright 
transfer of ownership, long-term leases can effectively reduce the size of a group’s 
collective land base for generations. Even if non-member lessees remain subject 
to the band’s governance powers, market incentives—especially the need to make 
67. Baxter & Trebilcock, supra note 8 at 65; Graben, supra note 8 at 422; Tom Flanagan & 
Christopher Alcantara, “Individual Property Rights on Canadian Indian Reserves” (2004) 
29:2 Queen’s LJ 489 at 512 [Flanagan & Alcantara].
68. Flanagan & Alcantara, supra note 67 at 516; Baxter & Trebilcock, supra note 8 at 64-65.
69. This was a concern raised with respect to First Nation reserves by a former First Nations 
chief familiar with land code adoption processes who asked to remain anonymous (personal 
communication, 26 July 2016) [Anonymous First Nations Chief ]. See also Baxter & 
Trebilcock, supra note 8 at 64.
70. Ellickson, supra note 7 at 1378.
71. Ibid. That said, some First Nations leaders regard reducing the segregation of First Nations 
people as a benefit that comes with development. See Chief Darcy Bear, supra note 18.
72. Lavoie, supra note 7 at 1029-49; Graben, supra note 8 at 419.
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credible commitments to investors—will generally constrain the group’s ability 
to use these powers.73 Accordingly, alienable interests can pose a significant threat 
to the collective autonomy of a First Nation.
More precise observations can be made about the three specific types of land 
regime rules that are the focus of this article and the considerations that are likely 
to be relevant to a community’s decision on these rules. The first set of rules we 
examine are those pertaining to the granting of a lease in community lands.74 
Most First Nations require a vote of the community as a whole for longer-term 
leases, with the threshold for holding a vote varying significantly. That said, 
six First Nations in our sample allow for the lease of community lands for any 
duration without a community vote.
What considerations might guide a community’s decision whether to 
require a vote of the community as a whole? Such a vote is likely to be costly 
and time-consuming. Accordingly, a requirement for a vote each time a lease is 
granted may reduce the band council’s ability to manage community lands in a 
nimble manner in response to changing market forces.75 The vote requirement 
adds to the transaction costs involved in acquiring a lease on reserve and may 
deter otherwise profitable transactions. Thus, there will likely be economic costs 
associated with requiring community votes for leasing community lands. That 
said, there may also be economic benefits associated with requiring a community 
vote. An indication of community support for a lease provides investors with a 
guarantee that the lease has widespread support in the community.76 If a lease 
were supported by council but opposed by community members, a subsequently 
elected band council might be hostile towards it and seek to terminate it or use 
its regulatory powers in an uncooperative manner.
These economic considerations may often be outweighed by considerations 
relating to the effect of a lease on the group’s ability to maintain its distinctive 
culture or way of life. A long-term lease can effectively reduce a First Nation’s 
collectively held land base for generations, restricting its ability to control what 
73. Graben, supra note 8 at 432.
74. In order to facilitate comparisons, our article focuses on land code provisions governing the 
grant of a lease to non-members. However, most codes apply the same requirements for 
leases to both members and non-members. Communities that apply different rules for leases 
to members vs. non-members are identified in Table 1 in the Appendix.
75. This was a point emphasized by Drew Lafond, an associate with MLT Aikins LLP and a 
member of Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, who has experience advising several First Nations 
on land codes under the FNLMA (personal communication, 4 August 2016) [Lafond]. The 
point was also emphasized by Chief Darcy Bear, supra note 18.
76. Anonymous First Nations Chief, supra note 69.
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goes on in its territory and reducing the space available for traditional activities 
or members’ homes.77 Members of a First Nation may also harbour distrust 
towards outside business interests, particularly if the community does not have 
adequate zoning and other regulatory infrastructure in place.78 A requirement 
for a community vote forces a period of reflection prior to such a significant 
decision and provides an indication that most members believe that the benefits 
of the lease (most likely economic) do indeed outweigh the costs in terms of the 
group’s collective capacity to govern activities in the territory and maintain its 
distinctive way of life.
With that in mind, factors that may be relevant in considering whether to 
require a community vote include the size of the First Nation’s reserve land base 
relative to its population, which may inform the group’s apprehension about an 
effective reduction in collectively held land; the remoteness of the community, 
which could affect its land development prospects; the level of economic 
development of the community, which could indicate, on the one hand, 
an openness to market-based development or, on the other, a perceived need to 
prioritize economic development in order to improve standards of living; and, 
finally, the cultural commitments and practices of the group, which may inform 
its desire to maintain a large collectively held land base governed by traditional 
norms and available for traditional uses.
This brings us to the second issue examined in our article: whether to 
require the approval of council for the transfer of an existing leasehold interest. 
This decision is likely to raise slightly different considerations, relating to the 
community’s ability to continue to control specifically who will hold an interest 
in community lands even after a lease has been granted. The costs involved in 
requiring approval for such transactions are largely economic. Requiring council 
approval for the transfer of leasehold interests on reserve is likely to decrease the 
value of these leases to potential lessees because it introduces a transaction cost 
as well as a degree of uncertainty. Moreover, all of the communities that require 
council approval for the transfer of a leasehold interest also, unsurprisingly, 
require council approval for the mortgage of a leasehold interest. Accordingly, 
an approval requirement introduces an additional transaction cost and a degree 
of uncertainty into a lessee’s ability to raise credit. Residential and business lessees 
are likely to value the power to transfer and mortgage their interests freely, and 
thus would likely be willing to pay a premium for this power. Requiring council 
approval for transfer of a leasehold interest is thus likely to reduce a First Nation’s 
77. Ibid.
78. Chief Darcy Bear, supra note 18.
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ability to profit from the granting of leases. The transaction costs involved in the 
subsequent transfer of leasehold interests could also deter mutually beneficial 
exchanges, resulting in a misallocation of land interests on reserve.
The benefits of requiring approval for the transfer of leasehold interests 
are largely non-economic. A requirement for council to approve the transfer or 
mortgage of a leasehold interest allows council to exert ongoing control over 
who can hold an interest in reserve land. This goes to an important aspect of 
the collective autonomy of a group, namely its ability to choose who will be 
given substantial powers to manage land in the community through a leasehold 
interest.79 This is an important component of a First Nation’s ability to control 
activities in its territory in accordance with its values and priorities. Allowing 
for the creation of freely alienable leasehold interests means, to some degree, 
giving up that power.
A factor that could be relevant to a group’s decision to require council 
approval for the transfer of a leasehold interest is the presence of market demand 
among non-members for residential or business leases on the reserve. If significant 
demand exists, the community could stand to profit more from the premium that 
lessees would be willing to pay for leases with transfer rights. This could tip the 
balance in favour of allowing for alienability. Other relevant factors are similar 
to those considered when deciding whether to require a community vote for 
the granting of leases, such as the size of the reserve relative to the First Nations 
population. A large reserve could make it easier for a community to pursue 
development plans in one area of the reserve while maintaining a distinctive and 
cohesive Indigenous community in another part of the reserve. Likewise, the 
cultural and ideological commitments of the community would also be a factor. 
Communities more comfortable with markets, or less committed to ensuring 
robust community control of activities on reserve, would presumably be more 
open to allowing lease transfers without council approval.
The last set of rules that we examine in this article concerns the inter vivos 
transfer of member interests among members of the First Nation. Member 
interests are land interests that can only be held by members. They are usually 
referred to as “certificates of possession” or “allotments” in the land codes 
analyzed in this study. The communities in the sample are divided on whether 
to require the approval of council for transfers of such interests. Allowing for 
the free transfer of member interests could enhance both the economic and 
individual autonomy interests of members. In economic terms, the absence of 
an approval requirement reduces both the transaction costs and the uncertainty 
79. Lafond, supra note 75.
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associated with transferring an interest among members. This helps to facilitate 
mutually beneficial transactions among willing buyers and sellers. The reduction 
of transaction costs means that potential sellers are likely to receive a better 
return from the sale, and potential buyers are more likely to find a seller at an 
acceptable price. The economic gains from this kind of liberalization might be 
limited, though, given the small size of the potential market for member interests. 
Perhaps more significant are the effects on individual autonomy. The absence of 
an approval requirement enhances the choice set available to individual interest 
holders and potential buyers. A member who wishes, for example, to leave the 
reserve is in a better position to do so, while those who live off-reserve and wish 
to join the on-reserve community are also better able to do so.
However, there are potential economic and non-economic costs associated 
with allowing unrestrained transactions in member interests. First, transactions 
of this nature could give rise to inequality in member-held interests, with a 
small number of community members holding interests over a significant 
proportion of the reserve and potentially using their interests to provide land 
for non-Aboriginal businesses and residences. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this is perceived to be an issue for the Westbank First Nation.80 Inequality of 
land holdings could have negative effects on the welfare of community members. 
In addition, it could harm both the cohesiveness of the group and the group’s 
ability to use its reserve lands to preserve its distinctive culture. A majority of 
First Nations persons in Canada live off-reserve.81 The lack of available reserve 
land is sometimes cited as a reason why members who would prefer to live on 
reserve are unable to do so.82 Moreover, the adoption of freely alienable member 
interests could increase the return that a member can expect to receive in selling 
his or her interest, thus encouraging members to leave the community and live 
off-reserve. Many see a thriving on-reserve community as an important factor in 
a First Nation’s ability to maintain itself as a distinct cultural entity in the face 
of assimilationist pressures. Accordingly, the potential for unequal land holdings 
not only entails the ordinary negative effects associated with economic inequality, 
but may also serve to constrain the capacity of the community to maintain its 
distinctive culture.
80. Flanagan & Alcantara, supra note 67 at 512. This was also noted by Lafond, supra note 75.
81. Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, Registered Indian Population by Sex and Residence 
2014 (2014), online: Government of Canada Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 
<https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1429798605785/1429798785836>.
82. Anonymous First Nations Chief, supra note 69. See also Flanagan & Alcantara, supra 
note 67 at 512.
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In addition, allowing member interests to be transferred freely could give 
rise to conflict if the interests are not well defined. Groups that previously relied 
on customary interests that were not well-defined might have to incur expenses 
in providing greater precision and “formalization” of those interests before liberal 
exchange rules can be adopted.83 In addition to the administrative costs involved 
in defining interests with greater precision, the process of formalization might 
displace traditional norms relating to customary interests, including norms 
that allow community members to spread the risk of potential adverse events. 
These could all be perceived as important costs weighing against allowing free 
alienability of interests among members.
One of the indicators that might inform a community’s decision to require 
approval for transfers of member interests would be the degree to which member 
interests in the community are formally defined. In addition, relevant factors 
could include the amount of reserve land per capita, as well as the proportion 
of the First Nation’s land base that is allocated to members rather than held 
collectively. Here as well, however, the cultural and ideological commitments 
of the community are likely to loom large. Groups with a more traditional or 
collectivist orientation are more likely to want to retain community control 
over the allocation of member interests, something that is not fully compatible 
with alienability.
Additional factors that could be relevant to all three types of rules include 
fiscal capacity and status quo bias. Communities with greater fiscal capacity might 
have more resources available for overseeing transactions, and therefore may be 
more likely to adopt approval processes. With respect to status quo bias, under 
the Indian Act, the granting of a lease in collectively held reserve land requires 
a community vote.84 Moreover, the transfer of either a certificate of possession 
or a leasehold interest requires the approval of the Minister.85 It is possible that 
some communities, long accustomed to oversight of transactions on reserve, are 
inclined to maintain oversight in part because it is what they are used to.86 Yet this 
does not fully explain why some communities would choose to deviate from the 
status quo. It may still be that communities whose members incurred greater costs 
83. Flanagan & Alcantara, supra note 67 at 516; Baxter & Trebilcock, supra note 8 at 64-65.
84. Indian Act, supra note 1, s 39.1.
85. Ibid, ss 24, 54.
86. On the tendency of post-colonial governments to continue oppressive and economically 
harmful policies of their colonial predecessors, see Daron Acemoglu & James A Robinson, 
Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Publishers, 
2012) at 111-13. Our thanks to André Le Dressay for raising this point.
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under the restrictive Indian Act regime would be more likely to opt for liberal 
transfer provisions when given the opportunity to adopt a land code.
III. RESEARCH METHODS AND RESULTS
A. DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
Our study aimed primarily to assess which characteristics of a First Nation 
correlated with particular choices regarding the granting and transfer of interests 
under the First Nation’s land regime. In order to facilitate comparisons across 
communities, we selected three variables on which a community adopting a land 
code faced a discrete choice: (1) whether to require a community vote for a lease 
of community lands to a non-member; (2) whether to require council approval 
for the transfer of a leasehold interest to a non-member; and (3) whether to 
require council approval for the transfer of a member interest to another member. 
Focusing on these particular issues necessarily means that some of the context of 
each code is missed, but it allows for ready comparison across First Nations and 
in terms of economic, demographic and other variables.
Table 1 summarizes the position of each of the thirty-three codes available 
in the data set on the three variables of interest. In most cases, the position of 
the code on each of the three issues is readily apparent. In cases where a possible 
ambiguity exists or the code’s position is somehow qualified, Table 1 notes the 
ambiguity or qualification and explains our classification decision. We sought to 
compare the choices of communities using demographic, economic and other 
data from a number of sources. In light of limitations in the data, we sought 
primarily to assess the characteristics of a community that might lead it to select a 
particular provision, rather than assessing possible effects of adopting a provision. 
One exception relates to the increase in off-reserve members that we observed 
with respect to communities that allowed for free alienation of interests among 
members. This is discussed in greater detail below at Section E.
Table 2 (in the Appendix) summarizes some of the key variables we used 
to compare the First Nations in our sample. Sixteen of the thirty-three bands 
in the sample are located in British Columbia, with the remainder spread 
among Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario. In addition, seven of the 
British Columbia bands are part of the Sto:lo Nation. In terms of assessing the 
remoteness of a community, we adopted the Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
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Canada Remoteness Classification, which is used for band funding purposes.87 
Twenty-two of the thirty-three bands are in Remoteness Zone 1, which is defined 
as being within 50 km of a service centre by road. The remaining eleven bands 
fall into Remoteness Zone 2, which is defined as being between 50 and 350 km 
of a service centre by road. None of the communities in the sample fall into 
Remoteness Zones 3 or 4, which designate the most remote communities.
We used demographic data derived from the federal Indian Register, which 
tracks the number of registered members of each First Nation on an annual basis, 
as well as the number living on and off reserve.88 We also relied on publicly available 
data from Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada regarding the physical size of 
each community’s reserve lands.89 In addition, we used the Aboriginal Population 
Profile from the 2006 Canadian Census to provide data on the proportion of 
the population of each reserve that is not a registered Indian.90 This allowed us 
to estimate the non-registered-Indian presence on each reserve, which differs 
significantly among the communities in our study. Unfortunately, a reliable 
assessment of shifts in the non-First-Nations population in each community in 
the time period covered by the FNLMA was not possible. The 2001 Aboriginal 
Population Profile was missing many of the communities in our sample, while 
the 2011 Aboriginal Population Profile relied on data from the voluntary 2011 
National Household Survey, which is widely held to be less reliable than and 
difficult to compare with previous mandatory surveys. The results of the 2017 
Canadian Census were not yet available at the time of this study.
In terms of economic indicators, we relied partly on the median income of 
the Aboriginal population in each reserve community from the 2006 Aboriginal 
Population Profile.91 Unfortunately, because of the small size of many of the 
communities, these data were only available for fifteen of the thirty-three First 
Nations under study. To supplement this income data, we also calculated the 
proportion of each First Nation’s revenue that came from sources other than 
government. While this is an imperfect measure of economic development on 
reserve, it stands to reason that communities with higher levels of economic 
development will be less dependent on government transfers. This is especially 
87. Band Support Funding Program Policy (updated January 2016), online: Government of 
Canada Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca>.
88. Data is published in annual reports. See Registered Indian Population by Sex and Residence 
2014, supra note 81. In addition, regularly updated data is available through the Indigenous 
and Northern Affairs Canada website. See First Nation Profiles, supra note 19.
89. First Nation Profiles, supra note 19.
90. Statistics Canada, 2006 Aboriginal Population Profile (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2007).
91. Ibid.
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so since the federal government does not claw back transfers based on increases 
in community-generated revenue.92 We obtained information on First Nation 
finances from compulsory disclosures under the First Nations Financial 
Transparency Act for 2013-14 and 2014-15.93 Data allowing us to estimate the 
proportion of a community’s revenues that came from government transfers were 
available for all but two of the communities in our study.
We also made use of historical data on the share of each First Nation’s reserve 
lands held under leases and certificates of possession. These data originated from 
the Geomatics Services Office of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada and 
were first collected by Marena Brinkhurst and Anke Kessler for their recent paper 
on lawful possession of reserve land and its determinants.94 The data we used gave 
the acreage and proportion of each First Nation’s reserve lands that were under 
leasehold or certificates of possession. This information was available in five-year 
increments between 1971 and 2006.95
Some qualifications are necessary about the availability and quality of 
data. We would have liked to include an indicator of the degree to which the 
pre-FNLMA customary interests on a reserve are well-defined, as this could be 
relevant to a decision regarding transfer restrictions. However, no such indicator 
seems to exist, at least among publicly available data. Moreover, we would also 
have liked to assess directly the degree of ownership concentration with respect to 
certificates of possession, but these data are similarly not available.
Next, something should be said about culture. Short of engaging in 
a detailed empirical study of the traditions and attitudes in each of the 
thirty-three communities, it is not possible to assess cultural commitments 
directly. However, some of the factors for which data do exist could serve as 
proxies for cultural commitments. The tribal affiliation of a First Nation—for 
instance, as part of the Sto:lo Nation—or its geographic location could correlate 
with cultural commitments. Other factors, such as the remoteness of the 
92. Band Support Funding Program Policy, supra note 87.
93. SC 2013, c 7. The current federal government has indicated that it will stop enforcing this 
Act, and plans to repeal it. However, band disclosures for 2013-14 and 2014-15 remain 
publicly available. See First Nations Profiles, supra note 19. See also Kathleen Harris, 
“Carolyn Bennett reinstates funds frozen under First Nations Financial Transparency 
Act” CBC News (18 December 2015), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
bennett-first-nations-transparency-1.3371591>
94. Marena Brinkhurst & Anke Kessler, “Land Management on First Nations Reserves: Lawful 
Possession and its Determinants” (2013) Simon Fraser University Department of Economics 
Working Paper. Our sincere thanks to the authors for sharing this data with us.
95. Data were available for all First Nations in our sample except Tsawwassen.
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community, the proportion of members living off reserve, and the size of the 
on-reserve non-registered-Indian population, could also serve as indicators for 
the community’s degree of integration into the settler society’s culture or the 
degree to which it maintains strong links with its traditional culture. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in Part IV.
Finally, with only thirty-three communities in the sample, any conclusions 
to be drawn are necessarily tentative. The challenge of a relatively small sample 
size is compounded by the fact that FNLMA communities whose land codes 
were not disclosed through the First Nation Land Management Resource Centre 
were not included in the study. It must be acknowledged that the thirty-three 
communities included in this study do not constitute a random sample, since 
there is an element of self-selection in the disclosure of a code through the 
Resource Centre. That said, the First Nations that were not included in our study 
all come from the same regions as those that were included: British Columbia, 
the Prairies, and Ontario. At a general level, the demographic and geographic 
characteristics of these excluded communities do not differ substantially from 
those of the communities included in the study.96 However, self-selection bias 
cannot be ruled out entirely. Indeed, there is a significant element of self-selection 
involved in adopting an FNLMA land code in the first place. Generalization of 
the results of this study to First Nations communities as a whole or even to all 
FNLMA communities should therefore be approached with caution. With all 
these caveats in mind, though, a number of clear trends emerge from the data 
that are worthy of consideration.
B. RULES FOR LEASING COMMUNITY LANDS
The large majority of the communities in our sample require a community 
vote for the lease of community lands to non-members, at least above certain 
thresholds for the term of the lease. However, six bands do not require such a vote 
96. The mean membership of the excluded communities is 883 vs 1037 for the communities 
included in the study. On average, 54% of the members of the excluded communities 
lived off-reserve, compared to 58% among the communities included in the study. Among 
the excluded communities, 29% are located in remoteness zone 2, and 71% are located 
in remoteness zone 1. Among the communities included in the study, 33% are located in 
remoteness zone 2 and 67% are located in remoteness zone 1. A remoteness classification was 
not available for Shawanaga First Nation. See First Nation Profiles, supra note 19.
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for a lease of any duration.97 In addition, among the First Nations that require 
a community vote, the threshold lease term to trigger a vote varies significantly. 
Some communities require a vote for all leases, while others require a vote only 
for leases of 50 years or longer.
For the twenty-seven communities that require some form of community 
vote, we analyzed the factors associated with the threshold for lease length at 
which a community vote must be held. A shorter threshold means that more 
potential leases are subject to a community vote requirement. In a single-variable 
regression, the length of the threshold was correlated negatively with the 
community’s location in BC and positively with the adoption of a rule requiring 
council approval for the transfer of a leasehold interest. In both cases the results 
were significant at a 99 per cent confidence level. Accounting for the small sample 
size, the result with respect to both variables remained reasonably robust in a 
multivariate regression.98 In other words, bands with lower lease-term thresholds 
for community approval were more likely to be from BC and were more likely to 
allow for the transfer of leasehold interests without council approval.
This analysis of communities that require a vote prior to granting 
leases points to a land code strategy associated with a number of BC bands, 
including the Westbank First Nation. These bands are relatively careful about 
granting leasehold interests in the first place, requiring a demonstration of 
community consensus in favour of the lease—even a lease of relatively short 
duration—through a community vote. At the same time, the leasehold interests 
that are granted are freely alienable. There is an intuitive link between these 
two propositions. Granting a leasehold interest that is transferable involves 
surrendering more control than granting an interest the transfer of which is 
subject to council approval. In the case of a transferable interest, the band gives 
up its ability to determine on an ongoing basis who will hold a land interest in 
its community. That said, transferable interests have a greater potential economic 
upside. The band is likely to reap a higher return on them, as both businesses 
and residents will tend to place a premium on the ability to sell or mortgage 
their interest. In addition, the absence of a council approval requirement removes 
potential transaction costs that could impede the efficient allocation of interests. 
97. The six First Nations whose codes do not require a community vote are Beecher Bay, 
Shxwha:y, Tla’amin Nation, Squiala, Ts’kw’aylaxw, and Tsawout. In these communities, 
leases of community lands require approval by the band council and/or a land management 
advisory committee.
98. In a multivariable regression with both factors, the BC effect remains significant at p = 0.07, 
while the transfer requirement effect drops to p = 0.11. See Table 3 in the Appendix.
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It makes sense, though, that a band that decides to opt for the economic benefits 
associated with freely transferable leases might want to add robust safeguards at 
the outset of the lease to ensure that the decision to lease has broad support in 
the community. This appears to be what is happening with the communities that 
allow for free transfer of leasehold interests but require a community vote for 
even relatively short-term leases.
Another way of looking at the community vote requirements for granting 
leasehold interests is to compare the communities that require a community 
vote for at least some leasehold interests with the six First Nations in our study 
that do not require a community vote for any length of lease. In these six 
communities, leases can be granted with the approval of the band council or a 
land management advisory committee alone. All six of the First Nations that lack 
a community vote requirement are located in BC. The fact that 99-year leases 
in these six communities only require council or committee approval seems to 
indicate a degree of openness to the grant of leases. Yet the approaches taken by 
these six communities are also consistent with the idea that liberal lease transfer 
provisions are associated with restrictive lease granting provisions. Five of the six 
communities that do not require a community vote for the grant of a lease do 
require council approval for the transfer of a leasehold interest. Thus, liberality 
with respect to lease transfer is associated with restrictiveness with respect to lease 
granting, and vice versa.
Another interesting correlation emerged with respect to the share of land 
under certificates of possession in 2001 (prior to the entry into force of all the 
codes in our sample except four that came into force in 2000). Having a greater 
share of land under lawful possession in 2001 was correlated negatively with 
having a community approval requirement.99 Those bands with more land held 
under certificates of possession were thus less likely to require a community vote, 
perhaps because of a greater degree of openness to individual land interests. 
However, the share of land under lawful possession did not correlate meaningfully 
with the threshold for a community vote. Similarly, the proportion of land under 
leasehold in 2001 did not correlate with either requiring a community vote or the 
lease-term threshold for such a vote.
Most of the other variables we examined did not correlate with either the 
length of the lease-term threshold for a community vote or the existence of a 
community vote requirement. None of the following factors yielded significant 
results: proportion of community-generated revenue, remoteness classification of 
the community, number of registered First Nation members in the community, 
99. In a binary logistic regression, the result was significant at p = 0.03.
(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL588
hectares of reserve land per registered member, proportion of reserve residents 
who are not Registered Indians, and membership in the Sto:lo Nation. There was 
a negative correlation between 2006 median Aboriginal income and the threshold 
for a community vote, but the significance of this correlation disappeared when 
we controlled for whether the band was located in BC. Moreover, data for 
median Aboriginal income were only available for fourteen communities with a 
vote approval threshold, so this result should be approached with some caution.
C. RULES FOR TRANSFERRING A LEASEHOLD INTEREST
The data on the transfer of a leasehold interest yielded some interesting results. 
Both the proportion of the reserve population that were not registered Indians 
and the location of the band in BC were correlated negatively with the adoption 
of a requirement for council approval for the transfer of a leasehold interest. Put 
another way, bands with a significant on-reserve non-First Nations population, 
according to the 2006 Aboriginal Population Profile, as well as bands from BC 
were less likely to require council approval for the transfer of a leasehold interest. 
All six of the First Nations that adopted liberal lease transfer provisions were 
located in BC.100 In a binary logistic regression, the proportion of the community 
that were not registered Indians was correlated negatively with the adoption of 
approval requirements for lease transfers. This result was significant at a 98 per 
cent confidence level.101
It would appear that the single most important factor that correlates with 
allowing for the free transfer of leasehold interests is the presence of a significant 
non-First-Nations population on the reserve. The only reliable data on 
non-registered-Indian on-reserve populations came from the 2006 Census. Since 
earlier data are not available, a word of caution is required. Slightly more than 
half of the land codes in our sample came into force after 2006.102 The rest came 
into force after 2002 but before 2006, except for four that came into force in 
2000. The correlation between free transfer of leases and proportion of on-reserve 
non-First-Nations individuals remains significant at a 97 per cent confidence 
level even when the pre-2002 codes are excluded. It seems unlikely that the 
non-First-Nations population in communities with pre-2006 codes changed 
significantly in the years between the adoption of their code and the 2006 Census, 
although it must be conceded that such changes could be influencing the result.
100. The six First Nations whose codes do not require council approval are Leqamel, Seabird 
Island, Tla’amin Nation, Tzeachten, We Wai Kai, and Westbank
101. See Table 4 of the Appendix, below.
102. The years of adoption are set out in Table 1 of the Appendix, below.
LAVOIE, LAVOIE,  LANd REGIME ChOICE IN CLOsE-KNIT COMMuNITIEs 589
The best explanation for the correlation between the 2006 non-registered-
Indian population and the adoption of freely transferable leasehold interests is 
probably along the following lines. Communities that already had a significant 
non-First-Nations population on their reserve lands at the time they adopted 
a land code likely possessed two characteristics. First, they likely had valuable 
residential land development prospects. There was demonstrated demand among 
non-Aboriginals for residential land on the reserve. Second, these communities 
appear to have been willing to exploit these development prospects prior to the 
adoption of their land code, most likely using the leasing provisions of the Indian 
Act. This second point needs qualification, since it is possible that some of the 
pre-FNLMA development occurred through leases on land held by individuals 
under certificates of possession. So it is not necessarily the case that all of the 
prior non-Aboriginal residential development enjoyed robust support in the 
community. That said, it is probably the case that some of this development was 
on community land and thus would have had to garner community support under 
the Indian Act.103 Accordingly, it seems to be some combination of community 
attitudes and circumstances that leads a community to adopt liberal lease transfer 
rules. The communities that adopt such rules seem to have both an openness to 
using land for development and opportunities to do so.104
The economic gains associated with adopting a liberal lease transfer regime 
are likely to be greater where there is stronger outside demand for acquiring 
leasehold interests on the reserve. Those interested in acquiring a residential land 
interest on a reserve are typically willing to pay a premium for the ability to freely 
sell or mortgage their interest. So it is not surprising that First Nations located 
in desirable residential areas (like the Okanagan Valley, Vancouver Island, or the 
Lower Mainland of BC) with demonstrated demand for residential land on their 
reserves have opted for liberal lease transfer regimes. This is an example of First 
Nations responding to the incentives presented by their geographic circumstances 
and opting for a liberal transfer regime where the gains from doing so are greater 
than they would be elsewhere. As emphasized in the previous section, however, 
many of these same First Nations have also adopted the safeguard of requiring a 
community vote at the outset of leases of community lands, even for relatively 
short leases. This would seem to indicate a keen awareness of the trade-offs 
103. Indian Act, supra note 1, s 39.1.
104. It has previously been observed that one of the principal early uses of FNLMA land codes was 
to facilitate cottage leases. Flanagan & Alcantara, supra note 67 at 515, citing graduate field 
work by Lana Bryon.
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involved in adopting a liberal transfer regime, and the potential threat it poses to 
ongoing community control of activities on reserve.
A number of other factors did not correlate meaningfully with council 
approval requirements for lease transfer in a binary logistic regression. The size of 
the First Nations’ membership did not correlate with lease transfer rules, nor did 
the proportion of community-generated revenue, Aboriginal median income, 
reserve land per capita, share of land under leasehold or certificates of possession, 
or the remoteness of the community.
D. RULES FOR TRANSFERRING A MEMBER INTEREST
The last aspect of the land codes that we analyzed was the decision whether to 
require council approval for the transfer of a member interest from one member 
to another. One weak but suggestive link emerged here with respect to the 
proportion of residents that were not registered Indians. Using 2006 Census 
data, we found that communities with a larger proportion of non-registered-
Indian residents were more likely to allow free transfer of interests among their 
own members. This result was only significant at an 89 per cent confidence 
level in a binary logistic regression, however. It might at first seem curious that 
the presence of non-First-Nations individuals on the reserve would influence a 
decision whether to allow free alienation of interests among members. It may 
be that a non-First-Nations presence in the community makes the community 
more market-oriented. Perhaps more plausibly, it could be that communities 
that are inclined to use their land for real estate development are already more 
market-oriented, and thus more inclined to allow for liberal land markets with 
respect to member interests.
Aside from this relatively weak correlation between allowing transfer 
of member interests and the number of non-registered-Indian residents 
living on reserve, we were unable to find significant correlations between 
externally-observable characteristics of the communities and the decision to 
allow free alienation of member interests among members.105 This may be in 
part because decisions about whether to allow transfers among members are 
more closely linked to the particular traditions and cultural commitments of the 
community, which are more difficult to observe than, say, circumstances relating 
105. None of the following factors offered significant results in a binary logistic regression: 
median Aboriginal income, the proportion of community-generated revenue, the remoteness 
classification of the community, the number of registered members of the First Nation, 
reserve land hectares per registered member, the share of land under leasehold or certificates 
of possession, and whether the community was in BC.
LAVOIE, LAVOIE,  LANd REGIME ChOICE IN CLOsE-KNIT COMMuNITIEs 591
to the community’s land development prospects. It may be necessary to engage 
in a more detailed examination of the culture, traditions, and institutions of 
particular indigenous groups in order to provide an accurate picture of what 
leads a group to allow for the free transfer of land interests among members. 
It is also possible that other factors for which data are not available predominated. 
The extent to which existing customary interests are well defined could also be 
significant, for instance, and we were unable to obtain data relating to this factor.
E. LIBERAL MEMBER INTEREST TRANSFER RULES AND COMMUNITY EXIT
While the principal focus of our analysis was on the characteristics of communities 
that led them to make certain choices in enacting their land codes, we made 
one observation that relates to the effects of rule choice: Communities that did 
not require council approval for the transfer of a member interest to another 
member experienced larger increases in the proportion of members living off 
reserve—that is, outside the community—in the years following the adoption 
of their land code. More precisely, there was a statistically significant negative 
correlation between the adoption of a requirement for council approval for the 
transfer of a member interest and the change in the proportion of members living 
off reserve between the year before and the third year after the land code came 
into force. This result was fairly robust. It remained significant at a 99 per cent 
confidence level when controlling for the population of the community, the 
proportional increase in the community’s total membership over the time period 
in question, and the share of land under lawful possession in 2001.106 The results 
of this regression are presented in Table 5 (in the Appendix).
Recall that under the Indian Act, the transfer of a certificate of possession 
from one member to another requires the approval of the Minister. First Nations 
that adopted a council approval requirement for the transfer of member interests 
106. We excluded seven communities from this analysis. Five (Henvey Inlet, Muskoday, 
Opaskwayak, Tla’amin, and Whitecap Dakota) were excluded because they had amended 
land codes, and it was not possible to determine with certainty which provisions governed 
the transfer of member interests in the three years following the initial adoption of their 
land code. Tsawwassen was excluded because we lacked data on the share of land under 
lawful possession in 2001. Westbank was excluded because the Westbank First Nation 
Self Government Agreement came into effect less than three years after the adoption of 
the Westbank First Nation Land Code, removing Westbank from the jurisdiction of the 
FNLMA. See Westbank First Nation Self Government Agreement (2003), online: <https://
www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031766/1100100031768>. Including these seven 
communities in the analysis did not alter the significance of the result with respect to the 
effect on the change in the proportion of off-reserve members.
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effectively opted to keep an analogous restraint on the alienation of member 
interests in place through their code. By contrast, those communities that did 
not provide for such an approval requirement removed this alienation restriction 
entirely. Removing the approval requirement for the transfer of a member interest 
facilitates community exit by eliminating a transaction cost associated with the 
sale of a member interest. By doing so, it increases the return that can be expected 
on such a sale and can enable a relatively small number of members to end up 
holding a greater proportion of the member interests on the reserve.
The idea that there could be a link between the return that a member can 
receive in selling his or her interest and the rate of community exit is not novel. 
Robert Ellickson noted that one of the ways that long-standing communal 
societies like Hutterite colonies and Israeli kibbutzes discourage exit from the 
community is by refusing to give members who leave the community a share of 
the group’s property.107 Members who leave must essentially leave with nothing. 
The effect of an approval requirement for the transfer of a member interest is 
much subtler, but the intuition is the same. By increasing transaction costs, such 
an approval requirement makes it less lucrative to sell one’s home and leave the 
community, and thereby discourages exit from the community.
Since member interests can only be sold to other members, sales of such 
interests would likely result in an increase in the off-reserve population if they 
came to be held by a smaller number of members who then put the land to uses 
other than housing members. Accordingly, if liberal member interest transfer rules 
lead to increased exit from the community, this is likely linked to an increase in 
the concentration of ownership of member interests. Unfortunately, data related 
to the ownership concentration of member interests are not publicly available.
An alternative explanation may be that the causation is in some way reversed. 
For instance, communities whose members are already leaving the reserve 
because the community is becoming less closely-knit or less oriented around 
their traditional culture may be more likely to adopt liberal member interest 
transfer provisions. However, there was no statistically significant relationship 
observed between the year-over-year change in the proportion of members living 
off reserve in the two years prior to the adoption of the code and the decision 
to require approval for the transfer of a member interest. In other words, it does 
not appear that communities whose members were already moving off reserve in 
greater numbers were more likely to adopt liberal transfer rules.
If nothing else, this result may serve to underscore some of the possible 
reasons why many of the communities have opted to retain alienation restrictions, 
107. Ellickson, supra note 7 at 1378.
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even for transactions among members. If liberal transfer rules can lead to an 
increase in members leaving the community or an increase in the ownership 
concentration of member interests, it makes sense that communities committed 
to maintaining a close-knit on-reserve community with an egalitarian distribution 
of land interests would opt to require council approval for the transfer of such 
interests. All that said, none of this should be taken as a call for communities 
to adopt council approval requirements for transfers of member interests. Far 
from it. Even if liberal transfer rules have some costs in terms of ownership 
concentration or community close-knittedness, it is entirely possible that these 
costs are outweighed by an improvement in allocative efficiency through the 
removal of transaction costs related to the sale of member interests, or through 
the benefits associated with individual autonomy. This is a trade-off best assessed 
at the community level by community members themselves.
F. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON LAND REGIME CHOICE
Several more general observations emerge from our land code study. The first 
is that First Nations located in BC are more likely to adopt leasing provisions 
that can be termed liberal. All of the bands that allow for either the transfer 
of leasehold interests without council approval or for the granting of leasehold 
interests of any length without a community vote are located in BC. This trend 
is not completely straightforward, given that the groups that allow for the free 
transfer of leasehold interests, including those in BC, are also more likely to 
adopt the safeguard of community votes at the outset of even shorter-term leases. 
Moreover, BC bands do not appear to be more likely to allow unrestrained 
transfer of member interests. However, there does appear to be a greater tendency 
on the part of BC bands to allow for liberal provisions with respect to leasehold 
interests, though the reason is not entirely clear.
One factor that sets most BC First Nations apart from groups in other 
parts of the country is the absence of an historical treaty relationship with the 
government. In Ontario and the Prairies, where all of the non-BC First Nations 
in the study are located, European settlement was generally preceded by agents 
of the Crown who entered into land cession treaties with First Nations. This 
gave rise to an ongoing treaty relationship with the Crown. For the most part, 
historic treaties were not entered into in BC. Perhaps the absence of historic 
treaty relationships is in some way linked to BC First Nations’ present-day 
approaches to land development. It is difficult to say what role the traditional 
culture, as opposed to the colonial history, of BC First Nations plays in this 
trend. While most of the BC First Nations in our sample are coastal, the group 
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that seems to epitomize the use of transferable leases as a basis for economic 
development is the Westbank First Nation, in the interior of BC. The traditional 
cultures of interior and coastal First Nations in BC are seen as quite different. 
This would seem to complicate any attempt to explain our results based on the 
traditional cultures of BC First Nations.108
Beyond considerations relating to the geographic location of communities, 
two further observations can be made. First, there appear to be real trade-offs 
relating to alienability with which the communities in the sample have had to 
grapple. This is seen in the somewhat startling finding that communities that 
allow for the free transfer of member interests have a higher rate of exit from the 
on-reserve community. The potential benefits of liberal transfer rules are well 
known, but this finding seems to indicate that communities must also weigh the 
perceived costs of such approaches. This may help explain why ten communities 
opted to require council approval for the transfer of a member interest, despite the 
absence of such a requirement in the First Nation Land Management Resource 
Centre’s model code.109
Perhaps the clearest indication that significant trade-offs are involved in 
restraining the alienation of land interests lies with the interaction between 
lease-granting provisions and lease-transfer provisions. Communities that allow 
for unrestrained lease transfer apply greater scrutiny in the granting of leases 
through the use of community votes, even for shorter-term leases. By contrast, 
among the six First Nations that allow leases of community lands of any duration 
without a community vote, all but one require council approval for the assignment 
of a lease.110 A more liberal approach along one dimension appears to result in the 
adoption of greater safeguards along another. In our view, the best explanation for 
this phenomenon is that free alienation can provide economic benefits but can 
also threaten community control. First Nations’ decision-making with respect 
108. That said, one might hypothesize that the traditional legal systems of coastal First Nations, 
which generally emphasized property in land held by relatively small kinship groups, might 
have made them more predisposed to individual and family ownership than other First 
Nations with more collectivist traditions. See Brian Thom, Coast Salish Senses of Place: 
Dwelling, Meaning, Power, Property and Territory in the Coast Salish World (PhD Thesis, 
McGill University Faculty of Law, 2005) [unpublished] at 270-335. See also Sarah Noël 
Morales, Snuw’uyulh: Fostering an Understanding of the Hul’qumi’num Legal Tradition 
(PhD Thesis, University of Victoria Department of Anthropology, 2014) [unpublished] at 
223-229. Our thanks to Sarah Morales for a very helpful discussion on this point.
109. Model Land Code, supra note 48 at s 35.1.
110. Tla’amin Nation is the one exception. See Sliammon First Nation: Amended Land 
Code, supra note 11.
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to alienability appears to be motivated by a desire to achieve the right balance 
among the competing considerations.
Finally, something can be said about the idea that close-knit communities 
tend to adopt rules that are adapted to their members’ interests, broadly defined. 
This is a difficult claim to assess because of the broad definition of member 
interests, though in principle it is falsifiable.111 A number of factors one might 
have expected to correlate with land regime choice do not seem to do so. These 
include the median Aboriginal income in the community, the proportion of 
community-generated band revenue, the amount of reserve land per capita, and 
the remoteness of the community. That said, there is at least one issue on which 
we have identified a strong tendency to select rules that are adapted to a First 
Nation’s circumstances: the transfer of leasehold interests. The communities that 
adopted freely transferable leasehold interests are precisely those communities 
that stand to gain the most from such interests. These communities are located 
in areas with a demonstrated demand for residential real estate on the part of 
non-Aboriginals and have historically demonstrated a willingness to exploit this 
demand. Even allowing that there are trade-offs in permitting alienable land 
interests, these are the communities that stand to gain the most from alienability 
in light of the premium that potential interest-holders should be willing to pay for 
the power to transfer or mortgage their interests freely. On this dimension, we can 
see a clear connection between the observable characteristics of a community’s 
circumstances and the rules they adopt.
It should be borne in mind that while this article focuses on readily 
observable factors like economic and demographic characteristics, some of 
the most important factors affecting the perception of the trade-offs related 
to alienability relate to the specific cultural and ideological commitments of 
community members. For this reason, a fuller understanding of the motivations 
behind First Nations land regime choice would require an examination of these 
particular cultural characteristics.
111. See Robert C Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1991) at 182-83.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The FNLMA was a major step forward for First Nations seeking to reassert control 
over their lands by developing rules adapted to their traditions, values, and 
circumstances. It also provides a unique opportunity to study land regime choice 
among close-knit cultural minority groups. The First Nations in the present study 
all lived under the same uniform land regime prior to the FNLMA and adopted 
custom land codes within roughly the same time period. Moreover, demographic 
and other data on these First Nation communities are much more comprehensive 
than those available for analogous minority groups in Canada or elsewhere. The 
detailed annual data on the proportion of each First Nation’s members living on 
and off reserve is a particularly useful resource that allowed us to assess some of 
the effects of rule choice. The FNLMA regime thus provides a good opportunity 
to study land regime choice in closely-knit minority communities. We hope this 
article contributes to an understanding of the trade-offs involved in adopting 
rules relating to the alienability of land interests, both in the context of the 
FNLMA and in general.
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V. APPENDIX
TABLE 1—LAND REGIME CHOICE RELATING TO ALIENABILITY OF INTERESTS112
First Nation 
(Province;  
Year Land Code 
Came into Force)
Community 
Vote Required 
for Lease of 
Community Lands 
to a Non-Member? 
(Threshold in Years) 
[Section(s) of code]
Council or Other 
Approval Required 
for Transfer of a 
Leasehold Interest 
to a Non-Member? 
[Section(s) of code]
Council or Other 
Approval Required 
for Transfer of a 
Member Interest to 
Another Member? 
[Section(s) of code]
Land Advisory Board 
Resource Centre 
Template
Yes (25)113 [s 12.1] Yes [s 30.5] No [s 35.1]
Anishinaabeg of 
Naongashing  
(ON; 2011)
Yes (35)114 [s 14.01] Yes [s 37.01] No [ss 36.03, 37.01]
Atikameksheng 
Anishnawbek 
(formerly Whitefish 
Lake) (ON; 2009)
Yes (25) [s 12.1] Yes [s 36.2] No [ss 34.2, 36.1]
Beecher Bay  
(BC; 2003) No [s 20.1] Yes [s 33.2] Yes
115 [s 33.1]
Chemawawin  
(MB; 2010) Yes (25) [s 12.1] Yes [ss 30.1, 34.1] Yes [ss 30.1, 34.1]
Chippewas of 
Georgina Island  
(ON; 2000)
Yes (50)116 [ss 13.3, 
13.5] Yes [s 17.3] No [s 17.1]
Henvey Inlet  
(ON; 2010) 
[Amended Code]
Yes (35)117 [s 13.01] Yes
118 [ss 34.01, 
36.01] No [ss 33.03, 34.01]
112. The source for all of the land codes analyzed here was a database of codes maintained by the 
First Nation Land Management Resource Centre. We accessed and analyzed the codes in 
May 2017. The codes are available at <https://labrc.com/resources/land-codes/>. In addition, 
copies of the codes are on file with the authors.
113. Community is approval not required for leases to members.
114. Community is approval not required for leases to members.
115. The code prohibits the creation of permanent member interests, and is instead oriented 
around members holding leases.
116. Community approval is not required for leases to members.
117. Community approval is not required for leases to members.
118. Transfers to non-members for commercial purposes may be exempted from Council approval 
requirements through a council resolution after community input.
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Kahkewistahaw  
(SK; 2011)
Yes (49/99)119 [ss 
14.6, 14.7] Yes [ss 14.1, 15.1] Yes [ss 14.1, 15.1]
Kinistin Saulteaux 
(SK; 2005)
Yes (35) [ss 15.2, 
15.3] Yes [s 22.1] Yes [s 22.1]
Leqamel (BC; 2010) Yes (15) [s 13] No [s 16.3] No [ss 12.6, 16.1]
Lheidli T’enneh 
(formerly Fort 
George) (BC; 2000)
Yes (0)120 [ss 12, 34.1, 
34.2] Yes [ss 30.5, 35.2] No [s 35.1]
Matsqui (BC; 2009) Yes (49) [s 23.1] Yes [ss 36.1, 36.2] Yes121 [s 36.2]
McLeod Lake  
(BC; 2003)
Yes (15) [ss 11.1, 
32.1] Yes [ss 34.1, 35.2] No
122 [ss 33.1, 35.1]
Mississauga  
(ON; 2009)
Yes (25) [ss 12.1, 
32.1] Yes [s 35.2] No [s 35.1]
Muskeg Lake  
(SK; 2005)
Yes (35) [ss 12.1, 
32.1] Yes [s 35.2] No [s 35.1]
Muskoday (SK; 2000) 
[Amended Code]
Yes (35)123 [ss 14.1, 
14.3, 16] Yes [s 18.1] Yes [s 18.1]
Nipissing  
(ON; 2003)
Yes (35)124 [ss 15.1, 
35.1] Yes [s 38.2] No [ss 36.2, 38.1]
Opaskwayak Cree 
Nation (MB; 2002) 
[Amended Code]
Yes (40) [s 12.1] Yes [s 34.2] Yes125 [s 34.2]
Seabird Island  
(BC; 2009)
Yes (25)126 [ss 19.3, 
19.4] No [s 23.1] No [ss 20.1, 23.1]
Mississaugas of 
Scugog Island  
(ON; 2000)
Yes (25)127 [ss 13.3, 
13.5] Yes [s 17.3 No [s 17.1]
119. The 99-year threshold applies to residential leases only. Community approval is not required 
if lease is for utility purposes.
120. Community approval is not required for leases to members.
121. The code prohibits the creation of permanent member interests, and is instead oriented 
around members holding leases.
122. The code prohibits the creation of permanent member interest, and instead is oriented 
around members holding leases.
123. Community approval is not required if the lease is for utility purposes.
124. Community approval is not required for leases to members.
125. The approval requirement is subject to any land law to the contrary.
126. Community approval is not required if the lease is for utility purposes.
127. Community approval is not required for leases to members.
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Shxwha:y (BC; 2007) No [s 29.1] Yes [ss 32.1, 32.2] Yes128 [ss 32.1, 32.2]
Skawahlook  
(BC; 2010)
Yes (50) [ss 51, 53, 
54; 103] Yes [s 29] No [ss 28, 40, 42]
Tla’amin Nation 
(formerly 
Sliammon)129  
(BC; 2004)
No [ss 33.1] No [s 31.6] No [s 34.3]
Squiala (BC; 2008) No [s 30.4] Yes [ss 28.4, 33.5] Yes [ss 31.2, 33.1]
Swan Lake  
(MB; 2010)
Yes (45)130 [ss 13.1; 
32.1] Yes [ss 33.2, 35.1] No [s 35.1]
Ts’kw’aylaxw 
(formerly Pavilion) 
(BC; 2004)
No [s 20.1] Yes [s 32.2] Yes [ss 30.2; 32.1]
T’Sou-ke (BC; 2007) Yes (25)
131 [ss 12.1; 
32.1] Yes [ss 30.5, 35.2] No [ss 33.2; 35.1]
Tsawwassen132  
(BC; 2003)
Yes (25) [ss 12.1; 
32.1] Yes [s 35.2] No [ss 33.2; 35.1]
Tsawout (BC; 2007) No [ss 28.1; 28.4] Yes [s 31.2] No [ss 29.2; 31.1]
Tsleil-Waututh 
(formerly Burrard) 
(BC; 2007)
Yes (15) [ss 11.1; 
11.2] Yes [s 15.6]
No [ss 15.2; 15.5; 
15.6]
Tzeachten (BC; 2008) Yes (15) [ss 4.9; 9.14] No [s 9.28] No133 [ss 9.25; 9.26]
We Wai Kai (formerly 
Cape Mudge)  
(BC; 2009)
Yes (0) [ss 11.1; 11.2; 
11.9; 11.10] No [s 15.4]
No [ss 15.1; 15.2; 
15.5]
128. The code prohibits the creation of permanent member interests, and is instead oriented 
around members holding leases.
129. On 5 April 2017, the Tla’amin Final Agreement came into effect, removing the Tla’amin 
Nation from the jurisdiction of the FNLMA and transferring existing reserve land to the 
Tla’amin in fee simple. Tla’amin Final Agreement, supra note 11.
130. Community approval is not required for leases to members.
131. Community approval is not required for leases to members.
132. On 3 April 2009, the Tsawwassen Final Agreement came into effect, removing the Tsawwassen 
Nation from the jurisdiction of the First Nations Land Management Act and transferring 
existing reserve land to the Tsawwassen in fee simple. See Tsawwassen First Nation Final 
Agreement Act, SC 2008, c 32.
133. The position of the code on this matter is not entirely clear on its face. We clarified 
the practice of the Tzeachten First Nation through communication with Deanna 
Honeyman, Lands Manager, Tzeachten First Nation, who confirmed that council approval 
is not required.
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Westbank134  
(BC; 2003)
Yes (15) [ss 11.1; 
11.2] No [s 15.4]
No [ss 15.1; 15.2; 
15.5]
Whitecap Dakota 
(SK; 2004) Yes (49/99) [s 14.6] Yes [ss 15.1, 15.2] Yes [ss 15.1; 15.2]
Notes on the Interpretation of Land Codes:
Community Vote Required for Lease of Community Lands to Non-Member? 
(Threshold in Years)
Most First Nations require some form of community vote for the granting of 
longer-term leases in community-held lands. Most communities apply the same 
rules to leases to members and non-members alike, but some codes differ along 
these lines. Our focus here was on whether a community vote is required for leases 
to non-members. These votes may take place either in the form of a community 
meeting or a referendum. This column indicates whether a community vote is 
required for the granting of some leasehold interests in community lands. The 
number in brackets indicates the threshold in years of the term of the lease beyond 
which a community vote is required. For leases with terms less than the number 
in brackets, a lease can normally be granted with a band council resolution only. 
For leases with terms greater than the number in brackets, a community vote 
is required. Some First Nations make exceptions for leases granted to utilities. 
These exceptions are indicated with footnotes.
Council or Other Approval Required for Transfer of a Leasehold Interest 
to a Non-Member?
Lease assignment rules are typically set out in a fairly straightforward fashion. 
In some communities, different rules apply depending on whether the lease is 
being assigned to a member or a non-member. We focused on the rules that 
prevailed for transfer to a non-member.
Council or Other Approval Required for Transfer of a Member Interest to 
Another Member?
For most First Nations, this refers to the rules governing the transfer of permanent 
possessory interests, which are termed “allotments” or “certificates of possession”. 
However, there are four First Nations, Beecher Bay, Matsqui, McLeod Lake and 
Shxwha:y, that prohibit the creation of permanent member interests and instead 
foresee members holding leasehold interests only. For these bands, this column 
reflects the rules governing member transfer of a leasehold to another member.
134. On 1 April 2005, the Westbank First Nation Self Government Agreement came into effect, 
removing the Westbank First Nation from the jurisdiction of the FNLMA. See Westbank First 
Nation Self Government Agreement, supra note 106.
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TABLE 2—SELECTED COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS
First Nation 
(Province)
Total 
Members 
(2017)135
Percentage of 
Membership 
Living 
Off-Reserve 
(2017)136
Remoteness 
Classification 
Zone137
Percentage of 
On-Reserve 
Population 
That Is Not 
a Registered 
Indian 
(2006)138
Increase in 
Percentage of 
Membership 
Living 
Off-Reserve in 
the Three Years 
Following the 
Adoption of 
the Code139
Anishinaabeg 
of Naongashing 
(ON)
428 53% 2 0% 2%
Atikameksheng 
Anishnawbek 
(formerly 
Whitefish Lake) 
(ON)
1232 65% 1 7% 4%
Beecher Bay 
(BC) 254 56% 1 21% -3%
135. Data on each First Nation’s membership size came from the federal Indian Register, which 
is updated online several times per year on the Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 
website. See First Nation Profiles, supra note 19. Data for 2017 was accessed electronically in 
May 2017. Data for past years came from the annual reports on First Nations population 
published by Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. See e.g. Registered Indian Population 
by Sex and Residence 2014, supra note 81.
136. Data on the proportion of each First Nation’s membership living off-reserve came from the 
federal Indian Register, which is updated online several times per year on the Indigenous 
and Northern Affairs Canada website. See First Nation Profiles, supra note 19. Data for 2017 
was accessed electronically in May 2017. Data for past years came from the annual reports 
on First Nations population published by Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. See e.g. 
Registered Indian Population by Sex and Residence 2014, supra note 81.
137. The remoteness classification is based on the formula in the Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Canada Band Support Funding Program Policy, supra note 87. There are four remoteness 
categories (1, 2, 3, and 4). All the First Nations in the sample fell into either Category 1 
or Category 2. 22 of the 33 First Nations fell into Remoteness Zone 1, which is defined as 
being within 50 km of a service centre by road. The remaining 11 bands fell into Remoteness 
Zone 2, which is defined as being within 50 to 350 km of a service centre by road. None of 
the communities in the sample fell into remoteness zones 3 or 4, which designate the most 
remote communities.
138. 2006 Aboriginal Population Profile, supra note 90.
139. These data were derived from the annual reports on First Nations population published by 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. See e.g. Registered Indian Population by Sex and 
Residence 2014, supra note 81.
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Chemawawin 
(MB) 1852 19% 2 3% 0%
Chippewas of 
Georgina Island 
(ON)
898 77% 2 N/A -1%
Henvey Inlet 
(ON) 840 77% 2 13% 3%
Kahkewistahaw 
(SK) 1970 68% 2 3% -1%
Kinistin 
Saulteaux (SK) 1012 62% 2 0% 2%
Leqamel (BC) 411 67% 1 76% 3%
Lheidli T’enneh 
(formerly Fort 
George) (BC)
429 77% 1 1% 10%
Matsqui (BC) 266 56% 1 73% -1%
McLeod Lake 
(BC) 551 74% 2 0% 6%
Mississauga 
(ON) 1302 70% 2 12% 3%
Muskeg Lake 
(SK) 2059 82% 2 0% -1%
Muskoday (SK) 1883 66% 1 0% 1%
Nipissing (ON) 2672 63% 1 39% 2%
Opaskwayak 
Cree Nation 
(MB)
5943 45% 1 8% 0%
Seabird Island 
(BC) 979 38% 1 10% 2%
Mississaugas of 
Scugog Island 
(ON)
233 78% 1 36% -2%
Shxwha:y (BC) 412 75% 1 0% -2%
Skawahlook 
(BC) 87 87% 1 N/A 1%
Tla’amin Nation 
(formerly 
Sliammon) (BC)
1083 45% 1 N/A 7%
Squiala (BC) 219 33% 1 0% 3%
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Swan Lake 
(MB) 1402 58% 2 0% 12%
Ts’kw’aylaxw 
(formerly 
Pavilion) (BC)
565 51% 2 9% 1%
T’Sou-ke (BC) 258 49% 1 31% 5%
Tsawwassen 
(BC) 365 48% 1 73% 7%
Tsawout (BC) 904 31% 1 67% 2%
Tsleil-Waututh 
(formerly 
Burrard) (BC)
580 26% 1 N/A 0%
Tzeachten (BC) 522 49% 1 78% 7%
We Wai Kai 
(formerly Cape 
Mudge) (BC)
1121 65% 1 16% 4%
Westbank (BC) 858 47% 1 92% 0%
Whitecap 
Dakota (SK) 636 51% 1 4% 1%
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TABLE 3—LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS (THRESHOLD FOR COMMUNITY VOTE)
Dependent Variable: Threshold of leasehold duration at which a community 
vote is required for leases to non-members (years)140
Multiple R 0.60
R Square 0.36
Adjusted R 
Square
0.31
Standard 
Error
12.01
Observations 27
ANOVA
 df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 1981.89 990.94 6.87 0.00
Residual 24 3464.11 144.34
Total 26 5446.00
Coefficients Standard 
Error
t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 24.63 7.69 3.20 0.00 8.76 40.50
Transfer of 
a leasehold 
interest to a 
non-member 
- council 
approval 
required?  
(yes = 1;  
no = 0)
11.57 7.03 1.64 0.11 -2.95 26.09
BC? (1=yes; 
0=no)
-10.63 5.50 -1.93 0.07 -21.98 0.72
140. Six of the 33 First Nations in the sample were excluded from this analysis, because these 
communities do not require a community vote at any threshold for the length of a lease. The 
excluded communities were Beecher Bay, Shxwha:y, Tla’amin Nation, Squiala, Ts’kw’aylaxw, 
and Tsawout.
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TABLE 4—BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS (LEASE TRANSFER)
Dependent variable: Approval requirement for transfer of a leasehold interest 
to a non-member (1 = yes; 0 = no)141
Regression Statistics
Number of 
Observations 29
Count of Dep Var = 1 24
Count of Dep Var = 0 5
Mean of Dep Var 0.83
Std Error of Dep Var 0.38
Sum of Squares of 
Residuals 3.07
Std Error of 
Regression 0.34
Log Likelihood -10.33
Average Log 
Likelihood -0.36
Restricted Log 
Likelihood -13.33
Akaike IC 0.85
Schwarz IC 0.94
Hannan Quinn IC 0.88
McFadden R Squared 0.23
LR Statistic (0 d.f.) 6.00
Prob of LR Statistic 0.01
Coefficients Standard Error Z-Score P-value
Constant 2.88 0.93 3.09 0.00
Proportion 
non-registered  
(2006 NHS)
-3.89 1.71 -2.27 0.02
141. Four communities were excluded from the analysis due to a lack of census data on the 
proportion of the on-reserve population that is not a registered Indian. The excluded 
communities were Tsleil-Waututh, Skawahlook, Chippewas of Georgina Island, and Tla’amin 
Nation.
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TABLE 5—LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS (OFF-RESERVE MEMBERS)
Dependent variable: increase in proportion of members living off reserve 
from one year prior to the adoption of the code to three years after the 
adoption of the code142
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.56
R Square 0.31
Adjusted R 
Square
0.18
Standard 
Error
0.03
Observations 26
ANOVA
Df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 0.01 0.00 2.41 0.08
Residual 21 0.02 0.00
Total 25 0.03
Coefficients Standard 
Error
t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.03 0.02 1.47 0.16 -0.01 0.06
Share under 
lawful 
possession 
(2001)
-7.60E-04 4.87E-04 -1.57 0.13 1.78E-03 2.47E-04
142. We excluded seven communities from this analysis. Five (Henvey Inlet, Muskoday, 
Opaskwayak, Tla’amin, and Whitecap Dakota) were excluded because they had amended 
land codes, and it was not possible to determine with certainty which provisions governed 
the transfer of member interests in the three years following the adoption their land 
code. Tsawwassen was excluded because we lacked data on the share of land under 
lawful possession in 2001. Westbank was excluded because the Westbank First Nation 
Self Government Agreement came into effect less than three years after the adoption of 
the Westbank First Nation Land Code, removing Westbank from the jurisdiction of the 
FNLMA. Including these seven communities in the analysis did not alter the significance 
of the result with respect to the effect of the council approval requirement on the change 
in the proportion of members living off-reserve. See Westbank First Nation Self Government 
Agreement, supra note 106.
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Proportion 
increase in 
registered 
members 
from year 
prior to code 
to three years 
after code
0.13 0.09 1.35 0.19 -0.07 0.32
Population 
the year prior 
to code
2.44E-06 1.21E-05 0.20 0.84 -2.3E-05 2.76E-05
Community/
Council 
Approval 
Required 
for Transfer 
among 
members 
(1=yes; 0 = 
no)
-0.04 0.01 -2.96 0.01** -0.08 -0.01

